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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation employs hedonic analysis to examine market demand for three 
neighborhood disamenities.  The first chapter investigates the property value impact of a No 
Child Left Behind “failing” school designation.  The second chapter studies the property 
value impact of a local homicide.  The third chapter examines the property value impact of 
proximity to a mosque post 9/11.  Each disamenity has a negative and significant effect on 
property values with the magnitude of impact varying across household type.  
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Property Values and Neighborhood Amenities 
______________________________________________________ 
 For the majority of Americans, the purchase of a home represents a household’s 
single largest investment and a significant portion of total wealth.  As such, housing demand 
is an important area of study.  One of the key tools in studying housing demand is hedonic 
analysis, which is used to estimate the implicit price of individual housing attributes and 
neighborhood amenities.  The three essays presented here employ hedonic analysis to 
examine market demand for a series of neighborhood disamenities. 
The first essay examines the property value impact of a No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) “failing” school designation.  Under NCLB, schools receiving Title 1 funding that 
fail to meet adequate academic performance targets for two consecutive years are deemed 
“failing” and sanctioned.  Details on these sanctions and “failing” designations are widely 
reported in local newspapers providing parents and prospective home buyers with additional 
information, beyond publically available test score data, about academic quality.  Employing 
a highly parameterized model which controls for a series of fixed effects, I examine whether 
this additional information on school quality is capitalized into the housing market, and find 
that a NCLB “failing” school designation results in a 6.9% decrease in property values 
holding constant test scores, student characteristics, and neighborhood and property 
attributes.    
To explore how demand for non-“failing” schools differs across household types, I 
introduce a two-stage estimator, which recovers neighborhood specific estimates of the 
impact of a “failing” designation.  These neighborhood specific estimates are then used in a 
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second stage regression to examine the relationship between the magnitude of impact of a 
“failing” designation and pre-period household income.  Applying this two-stage estimator, I 
find pre-period household income to be negatively correlated with the magnitude of impact 
of a “failing” designation.  In other words, low income families unable to afford private 
school tuition and without the necessary resources to sufficiently investigate a “failing” 
designation’s true information content are most affected.  This finding expands upon the 
single, uniform estimates of the market-wide impact of school-level categorical rankings 
currently available in the extant literature.     
The second essay investigates the property value impact of a local homicide.  Local 
instances of crime, especially when violent or aggressive in nature, can engender a climate of 
fear and anxiety among nearby residents, negatively impacting market demand for 
neighborhood housing.  Employing a difference-in-difference identification strategy, I 
exploit a unique dataset containing dates and locations of Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina homicides to examine variation in property values, pre and post homicide, within 
500 feet and 500-1,000 feet of the crime, a small homogenous area characterized by similar 
neighborhood and housing attributes.  Controlling for housing characteristics and time 
varying neighborhood-level heterogeneity, I find that, on average, homes sold within 500 
feet decrease in value by 13.4% relative to homes 500-1,000 feet of the crime in the year 
following the homicide.  
I investigate how the impact of a homicide differs across high and low crime areas, 
and find that in areas characterized by low levels of pre-period crime, homes located within 
500 feet of a homicide decline in value by 25.5% post homicide.  Alternatively, in areas 
characterized by high levels of pre-period crime, homes located within 500 feet of a 
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homicide see a statistically insignificant 9.4% decline.  These results are intuitively appealing, 
given that a local homicide likely has a differential impact on perceived neighborhood safety 
in low and high crime neighborhoods.  In low crime neighborhoods a local homicide 
represents a jarring divergence from the status quo, leading to a large change in perceived 
neighborhood safety.  Alternatively in high crime neighborhoods already mired in some 
degree of violence, a local homicide fails to provide as striking a signal, leading to only a 
small change in perceived neighborhood safety.  In addition, households that sort into low 
crime neighborhoods are more likely to have a higher willingness to pay for perceived 
neighborhood safety than households that sort into high crime neighborhoods.   
The third essay examines the impact of a post September 11th, 2001 increase in anti-
Islamic sentiment on property values, specifically analyzing whether, after the terrorist 
attacks, homes within close proximity to a mosque dropped in value.  Using a difference-in-
difference methodology, I find that post terrorist attacks, homes sold within 1,000 feet of a 
mosque declined in value by 17.1% relative to homes located within 1,000-2,000 feet of a 
mosque within the same neighborhood and sold during the same year.   
I explore how the impact of post 9/11 proximity to a mosque varied across 
household type, and find a negative correlation between the magnitude of impact and pre-
period neighborhood income.  Households at the top of the property value distribution were 
largely unaffected by post-attack proximity to a mosque.  To the extent income is correlated 
with education, this muted property value impact among higher income households may be 
a function of a broader cultural understanding and tolerance attained through higher 
education. 
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Together these three essays build upon our understanding of consumer demand for 
neighborhood disamenities.  Furthermore, by examining how the impact of disamenities 
varies across income levels, these essays offer evidence of differing consumer demand across 
household types. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
2. The Impact of a No Child Left Behind “Failing” School 
Designation on Local Property Values 
______________________________________________________ 
2.1 Introduction 
 In January 2002 President George W. Bush signed No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
into law, enacting legislation aimed at increasing K-12 academic standards and raising school 
accountability through measurable goals.  Under NCLB, on a yearly basis schools are 
required to satisfy a series of academic performance targets in order to achieve Adequate 
Yearly Progress (AYP).  Schools receiving Title 1 funding that fail to meet AYP for two 
consecutive years are deemed “failing1” and sanctioned2.    
 For a Title 1 school that fails to meet AYP for two consecutive years, details on 
sanctions and its NCLB “failing” designation are widely reported in local newspapers, 
providing parents and prospective home buyers with additional information, beyond test 
score data, about the school’s academic quality.  Several studies have shown that publicly 
available information on school quality, generally in the form of average test score data, has a 
significant impact on property values. I examine whether the additional information 
contained in a NCLB “failing” school designation is further capitalized into the housing 
                                                            
1 The term “failing school” is used in NCLB literature to denote Title 1 schools that fail to meet AYP for two 
consecutive years. 
2 These sanctions increase in severity for every subsequent year a “failing” school does not meet AYP.  
Initial sanctions include offering students alternative attendance opportunities and the development of a 
corrective action plan.  After five consecutive years of failing to meet AYP, Title 1 schools are temporarily 
shut down for a “restructuring and planning” year. 
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market.  Specifically, using data from Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, I investigate 
whether a NCLB “failing” school designation has an additional impact on property values, 
controlling for school-level math and reading proficiency.   
Employing a highly parameterized model which controls for a series of fixed effects, 
I find that a NCLB “failing” school designation results in a 6.9% decrease in property values 
holding constant other measures of school quality, student characteristics, and neighborhood 
and property attributes.  To explore how demand for non-“failing” schools differs across 
household types, I introduce a two-stage estimator, which recovers neighborhood specific 
estimates of the impact of a “failing” designation.  These neighborhood specific estimates 
are then used in a second stage regression to examine the relationship between the 
magnitude of impact of a “failing” designation and pre-period household income.  Applying 
this two-stage estimator, I find pre-period household income to be negatively correlated with 
the magnitude of impact of a “failing” designation.  In other words, low income families 
unable to afford private school tuition and without the necessary resources to sufficiently 
investigate a “failing” designation’s true information content are most impacted.  This 
finding expands upon the single, uniform estimates of the market-wide impact of school-
level categorical rankings currently available in the extant literature.     
2.2 Literature Review 
 This section examines recent empirical work on the impact of school quality on 
property values.  While much of the previous work has focused on the impact of various test 
scores on property values, three recent papers by Kane, Staiger, Samms, Hill, and Weimer 
(2003), Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2008), and Figlio and Lucas (2004) have examined 
the impact of school-level categorical ratings on housing values.     
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 Black (1999) estimates the impact of school quality on property values by adopting a 
border methodology and examining home sales on either side of, but adjacent to, elementary 
school zoning boundaries.  She finds that a one school-level standard deviation increase in 
elementary school test scores increases home prices by 2.2%.  Kane, Staiger, and Riegg 
(2006) employ a similar methodology in their study of the relationship between school 
characteristics and housing prices in Mecklenburg County from 1994 through 2001.  They 
estimate a one school-level standard deviation increase in elementary school test scores leads 
to a 2% increase in property values.  Border methodologies have also been used by Leech 
and Campos (2003), Kane, Staiger and Samms (2003), Gibbons and Machin (2003), and 
Brasington and Haurin (2006). 
Compared to work on the capitalization of test scores, very little has been written on 
demand for school-level categorical rankings.  Kane, Staiger, Samms, Hill, and Weimer 
(2003) investigate, among other school-level characteristics, the impact of pre-NCLB state 
mandated categorical ratings on property values in Mecklenburg County.  With the exception 
of a negative and statistically significant composite measure detailing the number of years a 
school is labeled “low performing,” the authors find categorical ratings had no statistically 
significant effect on property values.  Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2008) investigate the 
impact of a similar rating system in Louisiana and find that moving up a categorical ranking 
increases house values by approximately 5%.  Alternatively, moving down a ranking 
increases a house’s time on the market, but has no statistically significant effect on its selling 
price.  Figlio and Lucas (2004) examine the impact of school-level grades of A through F on 
property values.  Precursors to NCLB’s system of school accountability, Florida’s grades 
were based upon a school’s test performance on nationally normed assessments.  Using data 
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from before and after the introduction of these grades, Figlio and Lucas find moving up a 
grade increment raises property values by roughly 10%.   
All three of these studies offer valuable insights into consumer demand for school-
level categorical rankings, but, by only investigating market-wide effects, they limit 
themselves to single, uniform estimates of the property value impact of changes to a school’s 
categorical ranking.  As such, they fail to fully explore how consumer demand varies across 
neighborhood specific household types.  In addition to estimating the overall market-wide 
impact of a “failing” school designation, my paper recovers neighborhood specific impacts, 
which allow me to investigate how the impact of a “failing” school designation varies across 
neighborhood specific submarkets characterized by differing household types. 
2.3 Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools 
This section provides a brief background on school choice at Charlotte Mecklenburg 
Schools (CMS) and examines the wide array of elementary schools, as characterized by 
differing levels of student academic achievement, receiving a NCLB “failing” designation.   
2.3.1 School Choice in Mecklenburg County 
Starting in 2002 and continuing throughout my period of analysis, CMS operated 
under a district-wide school choice plan.  The school choice plan allowed parents to submit 
their top three choices of school programs for each of their children.  Key for my analysis, 
admittance to a student’s home school was guaranteed, but access to “choice” schools was 
limited due to significant oversubscription.  Approximately 65% of district schools were 
oversubscribed in fall 2004 (Hastings and Weinstein, 2007).  Given oversubscription to a 
“choice” school, entry was granted on the basis of a lottery.   
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In summer 2004, the Charlotte Mecklenburg School (CMS) system began the first 
phase of NCLB sanctions for Title 13 schools failing to meet AYP for two consecutive years.  
Parents of students slated for fall enrollment in a “failing” school were notified of the 
school’s NCLB status and offered alternative attendance opportunities4.  Again, guaranteed 
admittance among alternative choices was limited due to oversubscription in a significant 
fraction of district schools.  Over 84% of students slated for fall 2004 enrollment in a 
“failing” school ultimately attended, unable to find feasible alternative attendance 
opportunities (Hastings and Weinstein, 2007).  Because, even with significant 
oversubscription, a certain degree of school choice exists for parents confronted with a 
NCLB “failing” school designation, my estimates of the property value impact of a NCLB 
“failing” school designation will represent a lower bound. 
2.3.2 “Failing” School Designations in Mecklenburg County 
Under NCLB, to achieve adequate yearly progress, a school has to satisfy academic 
performance targets across a wide array of student sub-groups.  If even one of these sub-
groups is unable to meet their prescribed performance targets, the entire school fails to 
achieve adequate yearly progress regardless of the academic success of the larger student 
body.  If a Title 1 school fails to achieve adequate yearly progress for two consecutive years 
it is deemed “failing”.  As a result, a “failing” designation is largely orthogonal to more 
traditional measures of academic quality, namely school-wide average test scores.   
Table 2.1 details 2003-2004 adequate yearly progress reports for four Title 1 schools 
and offers evidence of the disconnect between school-wide average test scores and “failing” 
                                                            
3 At CMS, a school receives Title 1 funding if 75% or more of its students qualify for federal lunch 
subsidies.  
4 NCLB “failing” designations are assigned each year in late July. 
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designations5.  Although Hidden Valley Elementary enjoyed the highest school-wide math 
and reading proficiency (89.2% math proficiency and 75.2% reading proficiency) across the 
four Title 1 Schools listed in Table 2.1, it failed to meet adequate yearly progress for the 
“Limited English Proficient” student subgroup in reading, and received a “failing” 
designation.  Alternatively, Westerly Hills Elementary had school-wide math proficiency of 
76.4% and school-wide reading proficiency of 66.9%, but met all adequate yearly progress 
requirements across sub-groups and remained non-“failing.”        
The disconnect between “failing” designations and average test scores is further 
evidenced in Figure 2.1, which depicts the miscellany of school types receiving a NCLB 
“failing” designation during 2004, its first year of implementation.  As shown, average 
student proficiency in math and reading, which is calculated based upon end-of-year test 
scores, varies from a low of 65% to a high of 85% among “failing” schools.  Because of the 
disconnect between a “failing” designation and test scores, a wide array of household types 
with differing valuations of school quality experienced a “failing” designation including those 
households sorting into neighborhoods characterized by schools with 85% student 
proficiency.     
Even households aware that “failing” designations were to be released in summer 
2004 could do little, in terms of an anticipatory move, to ensure a “failing” school would be 
                                                            
5 A student sub‐group must have at least 40 members to be subject to AYP requirements.  If a particular 
student sub‐group fails to meet their proficiency goal there are two provisionary calculations under which 
they may still be able to meet adequate yearly progress, Safe Harbor and Confidence Interval.  Under Safe 
Harbor, a student sub‐group can meet its proficiency target if the sub‐group has reduced same subject 
area non‐proficiency by at least 10% from the previous year and the sub‐group “shows progress” on the 
Other Academic Indicator.  Under Confidence Interval, a 95% confidence interval is calculated based upon 
the percentage of students scoring proficient.  If the confidence interval contains the proficiency target, 
the student sub‐group provisionally meets adequate yearly progress. 
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avoided6.  Previous year test scores offered little predictive power in determining future 
NCLB “failing” school designations, precluding pre-announcement household sorting upon 
a school’s anticipated NCLB designation.  This lack of predictive power is demonstrated in a 
probit regression of 2004-2005 NCLB “failing” school designations on 2002-2003 and 2003-
2004 grade-level test scores. All previous year test score measures included in the regression 
are statistically insignificant, unsuccessful in explaining across school variation in future 
“failing” designations.   
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
According to the consensus model of bidding and sorting (Ross and Yinger, 1999) 
households sort into neighborhoods based upon the slope of their bid functions with respect 
to location specific amenities.  The slope of the bid function for an amenity indicates a 
household’s willingness to pay for an additional unit of amenity quality.  Households with 
steeper bid functions are willing to pay more for an increment in amenity quality and win the 
bidding competition to locate in neighborhoods with high quality amenities.   
Prior to No Child Left Behind and the advent of “failing” school designations, 
household perception of school quality was largely informed by word of mouth and 
publically available information on test scores.  During this period, households that placed a 
high value on education, corresponding to a steep bid function for school quality, won the 
bidding competition for housing in neighborhoods linked to high-quality schools (as defined 
by positive word of mouth and high test scores).  Figure 2.2 illustrates three household types 
bid functions for perceived school quality.  In this figure, household type H1 places relatively 
                                                            
6 Apart from moving to non‐Title 1 school attendance zones, although this was potentially cost 
prohibitive.   
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little value on an increment in school quality and locates in neighborhoods linked to low-
quality schools, H2 places more value on a school quality increment than H1 and locates in 
neighborhoods linked to mediocre schools, and H3 places the most value on a school quality 
increment and locates in neighborhoods linked to high-quality schools.  
With the introduction of NCLB “failing” school designations, households are 
provided with an additional indicator of school quality, which, conditional on test scores and 
word of mouth assessment, reduces a household’s bid by	∆ /∆ , where  indexes 
household type and ∆  denotes moving from non-“failing” to “failing” status.  Because of 
the disconnect between a “failing” designation and other, more traditional measures of 
school quality, H1, H2, and H3 household types all experience a “failing” designation.   
Figure 2.3 illustrates the impact of a NCLB “failing” designation on each household 
type’s bid function.  As illustrated, the magnitude of ∆ /∆  is likely to vary across 
household types depending on their valuation of education, private school access, and 
understanding of the information content (or lack thereof) contained in a “failing” 
designation.  For example, while high-income college educated households often put 
significant value on the quality of their children’s education, they are also more likely to send 
their children to private school, moderating the impact of a public school “failing” 
designation.  College educated households are also potentially more likely to research 
“failing” designations and discover their tenuous connection to overall school quality. 
Given ∆ /∆ ,	the property value impact of a “failing” school designation can be 
calculated as follows: 
                                 		∆ /∆ ∆ /∆ ∗ /                                              (2.1) 
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where V is the value of a house, H is units of housing services, and r is a discount rate.  
While a standard property value hedonic identifies a NCLB “failing” school designation’s 
average housing market impact, ∑ ∆ /∆ , it fails to provide information on the varying 
impact across neighborhood specific household types.   
I introduce a two-stage estimator (described in detail in Section 2.7.3b) which 
recovers these neighborhood specific impacts for use as the dependent variable in a second 
stage regression examining the relationship between the impact of a “failing” designation 
and pre-period household income.  This two-stage estimator improves upon the single, 
uniform estimates of the property value impact of school-level categorical rankings 
presented in Kane, Staiger, Samms, Hill, and Weimer (2003), Figlio and Lucas (2004), and 
Zahirovic-Herbert and Turnbull (2008). 
2.5 Data  
My analysis draws on three datasets: arm’s length sales of single family homes in 
Mecklenburg County from June 2002 through May 2006; disaggregated tax assessor data 
containing the locations and housing characteristics of all parcels in Mecklenburg County; 
and student characteristics, yearly test scores, Title 1 status, and NCLB “failing” designations 
for elementary schools in the Charlotte Mecklenburg School District.   
I combine the sales and tax assessor data to create a dataset containing the locations, 
characteristics, and sale dates and prices, normalized to August 2006 dollars, of all properties 
sold within Mecklenburg County from June 2002 to May 2006.  The data include 
comprehensive building characteristics including the year built, the number of bedrooms and 
baths, two measures of build quality, and the type of build materials used.  Within the data, 
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homes are separated into 1,004 neighborhoods characterized by similarly valued, 
homogenous properties.  These neighborhoods are extremely small - on average only 0.47 
square miles in area – even smaller then census tracts or block groups; there were 144 census 
tracts and 373 block groups in Mecklenburg County in 2000. Sales outside the range of 
$5,000 to $1 million dollars (representing the 1st and 99th percentile of the price distribution) 
are dropped.  The resulting sample consists of 84,405 home sales.    
After merging the sales and tax assessor data I link each real estate parcel to its 
assigned or home elementary school, for which a student is automatically guaranteed 
admission.  This is accomplished through Geographic Information System (GIS), which I 
use to overlay a map of elementary school boundaries, provided by Charlotte Mecklenburg 
Schools (CMS), onto a map of all Mecklenburg County real estate parcels.  I then join the 
layers.  With each real estate parcel attached to an assigned elementary school, I append 
student characteristics, test scores, Title 1 status, and NCLB “failing” school designation7.  
Figure 2.4 displays a map of CMS elementary schools that received a “failing” designation 
for the 2004-2005 school year. 
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of various characteristics of the properties sold 
within Mecklenburg County from June 2002 through May 2006.  The first column provides 
information on all sales within Mecklenburg County, and the second provides information 
on sales of homes linked to “failing” schools.   We see that homes linked to “failing” schools 
have      fewer stories, are of lower build quality, roughly 12 years older, and sell for 
approximately $96,000 less than homes in our larger sample of sales across Mecklenburg 
County.        
                                                            
7 Because North Carolina has county‐level school districts, every parcel in my sample of real estate sales 
faces the same school tax rate and policy regime. 
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2.6 Empirical Methodology 
To reduce the probability that unobserved factors are driving the relationship 
between a “failing” school designation and property values, I adopt an empirical 
methodology originally proposed by Figlio and Lucas (2004)8 and estimate a highly 
parameterized model, which controls for a series of fixed effects: 
																log Ζ              (2.2) 
where  is the sales price of home i in neighborhood j assigned to home elementary 
school s at time t.   is a vector of housing characteristics,  and Ζ  is a vector of 
elementary school attributes, which includes the following student characteristics, each 
measured as a percentage of the school’s total student population: Black, Hispanic, Limited 
English Proficiency (LEP), Economically Disadvantaged, and Special Education.  Ζ  also 
includes percentage proficient on 4th grade reading and math end-of-year assessments9 and 
the school’s Title 1 status.   denotes a NCLB “failing” school designation, 	is a 
non-parametric neighborhood-by-calendar year time trend, and  is a month-of-year 
indicator. 
Neighborhood-by-calendar year fixed effects coupled with mid-year changes in a 
school’s “failing” status allow me to identify the impact of a “failing” designation via 
discontinuity regression.  Changes in a school’s “failing” status are associated with within 
neighborhood changes in housing prices immediately before and immediately after a late July 
change in “failing” status.   
                                                            
8 Figlio and Lucas use repeat sales while I rely on a rich set of housing characteristics to control for time 
invariant parcel‐level heterogeneity.     
9 Proficiency levels are associated with housing sales based upon the release date of test results. 
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 In this specification, the vector of housing characteristics captures parcel-level 
heterogeneity, and the neighborhood-by-calendar year fixed effects allow for non-parametric 
neighborhood specific time trends which capture time varying heterogeneity at the 
neighborhood-level such as the introduction of a local park or new sidewalks and 
streetlamps.  Student characteristics and Title 1 status capture time varying school-level 
heterogeneity such as changing student demographics and the level of poverty in an 
elementary school’s catchment area.  Percentage proficient on 4th grade reading and math 
end-of-year assessments controls for an alternate measure of overall academic quality.  
Finally, month-of-year indicators control for the seasonal nature of Mecklenburg County’s 
housing market.   
As in Figlio and Lucas (2004), given this extensive set of controls, an omitted 
variable would need to change systematically within a neighborhood mid-way through a year, 
while at the same time co-varying with changes in an elementary school’s NCLB “failing” 
school designation for it to bias my analysis. 
2.7 Estimation Results 
2.7.1 Impact of Test Scores on Property Values  
To assess the impact of test scores on property values and compare my results with 
previous findings, I estimate equation (2.2) without the NCLB “failing” school designation 
and find that a one point increase in average fourth grade math and reading proficiency 
increases property values by 0.19%, a result significant at the 1% level.  This equates to a one 
school-level standard deviation increase in fourth grade reading proficiency increasing 
property values by approximately 1.9%, an estimate similar in magnitude to the test score 
effects found by Black (1999) and Kane, Staiger, and Riegg (2004).     
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2.7.2 Impact of a NCLB “Failing” School Designation on Property Values  
Next, I re-estimate equation (2.2) with the “failing” indicator and find that a NCLB 
“failing” school designation decreases property values by 6.9%, a result statistically 
significant at the 1% level (Table 2.3, column 1).  Because the “failing” indicator is binary 
and the dependent variable is logged, percentage change is calculated by exponentiating	 , 
the coefficient estimate attached to	 , and subtracting one10.  By including 
neighborhood-by-calendar year fixed effects I am identifying the impact of a NCLB “failing” 
designation from two sources of variation: schools transitioning in and out of a NCLB 
“failing” designation, and for those neighborhoods extending over one or more attendance 
zone boundaries, inter-school differences in “failing” designations.   
To generate a more complete understanding of the overall impact of a NCLB 
“failing” school designation, I estimate a model with separate neighborhood and sale year 
fixed effects; 	and	  respectively. This specification allows me include the effect of a 
second successive year of NCLB sanctions for neighborhoods contained within a single 
attendance zone11.  Given my sample includes two years of pre-period data and two years of 
post-period data, neighborhood fixed effects can be interpreted as neighborhood specific 
event windows spanning 24 months prior and 24 months post “failing” designation.  To 
                                                            
10 Because   is a binary variable its correlation coefficient measures	∆log /∆ .  This 
can be re‐expressed as follows:   log , , 	/	 , 1 , 0
log , , .  Exponentiating, subtracting one from each side, and multiplying by 100 yields: 
exp 1 ∗ 100 , , ∗ 100/ , , or the percentage change in sales price from a 
“failing” designation.   
11 With neighborhood‐by‐year fixed effects, identifying variation for neighborhoods contained within a 
single attendance zone arises from schools transitioning in and out of a NCLB “failing” designation.  As a 
result, information from a second successive year of “failing” is lost. 
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control for time varying heterogeneity within these neighborhood specific event windows, I 
add a series of interaction terms, ∗ / , which allow for non-linear time trends: 
						log Ζ ∑ ∑ ∗ / 	
																														                                                                                      (2.3) 
Estimating equation (2.3), I find that a NCLB “failing” school designation decreases 
property values by 4.7%, a result statistically significant at the 5% level (Table 2.3, column 2).  
The lower estimated impact of a NCLB “failing” designation when including the effect of a 
second successive year of sanctions may reflect the lack of an information shock associated 
with a second year of “failing”.  Alternatively, it may be a function of increased bias from 
unobserved time varying neighborhood-level heterogeneity, which I am unable to fully 
capture with parameterized neighborhood-level time trends. 
2.7.2a Analysis Limited to Title 1 Neighborhoods 
By estimating a single set of parameters across neighborhoods associated with Title 1 
and non-Title 1 schools, I am implicitly assuming poolability across the two subgroups.  As 
an alternative specification, I limit my analysis sample to neighborhoods contained within or 
extending over an attendance zone associated with a Title 1 school, and re-estimate equation 
(2.2). Analyzing this sub-sample, I find that a “failing” school designation decreases property 
values by an estimated 5.6%, a result statistically significant at the 1% level and qualitatively 
similar in magnitude to the full sample results12 (Table 2.3, column 3). 
                                                            
12 Post estimation, I test the equality of the “failing” coefficient estimates from the full sample and Title 1 
neighborhood regressions and am unable to reject the null hypothesis that the estimates are equal at the 
5% level. 
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2.7.2b Time since NCLB Announcement 
 To examine how the impact of a NCLB “failing” school designation varies with time 
since announcement, I interact the “failing” indicator with a cubic of time since initial 
announcement:   
	log Ζ ∗ ∗
											 ∗ ∑ ∑ ∗ / 	          (2.4) 
It is important to note that this analysis requires me to again extend the time horizon 
of the discontinuity regression by replacing neighborhood-by-calendar year fixed effects with 
separate neighborhood and year fixed effects. 
The coefficient estimates attached to all three terms of the cubic - , , and	  – 
are statistically significant and their combined effect, describing the varying impact of a 
“failing” designation with time since initial announcement, is graphed in Figure 2.5.  As 
illustrated, the estimated impact of a “failing” designation is smaller in magnitude than 
estimates from equation (2.2).  Again, I attribute this decrease in magnitude to bias from 
unobserved time varying neighborhood-level heterogeneity, which I am unable to fully 
capture with parameterized neighborhood-level time trends.  Even so, noting the direction 
of likely bias, the dynamic analysis offers useful insight into how the impact of a “failing” 
designation varies with time since initial announcement.      
Interestingly, the negative impact of a “failing” school designation increases in 
magnitude in the months following announcement, plateauing at approximately -4.8% in 
month six, and then slowly decreasing in magnitude after month ten.  At month 19, the 
estimated impact again plateaus at approximately -1.0% through month 22.  Because my data 
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only extends to May 31st, 2006, and, for the majority of Mecklenburg County schools, 
“failing” designations were first received in late July 2004, I am unable to test for post 
twenty-two month impacts13.   
The increasing magnitude of a “failing” school designation in the first six months 
post NCLB announcement appears to indicate a relatively slow diffusion of information 
regarding this additional indicator of school quality.  Two potential explanations arise for the 
decreasing impact of a “failing” designation beginning in month 11.  The initial shock of a 
“failing” designation coupled with a commensurate overreaction may wane, and as time 
passes, either through lack of any reinforcing information, or increased investigation, more 
and more families may come to realize that a “failing” designation is largely disconnected 
from measures of overall school quality.   
2.7.2c Varying Impact at Different Points along the Property Value Distribution 
To investigate whether a NCLB “failing” school designation has an equal impact 
across heterogeneous properties, I run a simultaneous quantile regression to estimate the 
impact of a NCLB “failing” school designation at different points on the property value 
distribution, with results illustrated in Figure 2.6.  The impact of a “failing” designation 
appears relatively uniform across the property value distribution yielding an estimated 6%-
7% property value decline.  
 
 
                                                            
13 To ensure my results are not a construct of the functional form imposed upon the time trend, I re‐run 
my dynamic analysis replacing failing X time, failing X  , and failing X   with a series of failing x 
month post announcement indicators.  This alternative specification allows for a non‐parametric time 
trend and yields qualitatively similar results to equation (2.4). 
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2.7.3 Differential Impact across Homes Stratified by Size and Neighborhood Income 
 As discussed in the theoretical framework (Section 3), the impact of a NCLB 
“failing” school designation varies across income-taste classes, with certain household types 
willing to pay more for improved school quality, and others willing to pay less.  I examine 
the differential impact of a NCLB “failing” school designation across two variables which 
characterize household type, family-size and household income.   
2.7.3a Homes Stratified by Size 
 Since larger houses are more likely to be occupied by families with children, I next 
investigate the differential impact of a NCLB “failing” school designation on houses based 
upon number of bedrooms14.  Dividing my sales data into two sub-samples, homes with 0-2 
bedrooms and homes with 3+ bedrooms, I re-run equation (2.2).  I find that homes with 3+ 
bedrooms, which are significantly more likely to be occupied by families with children, 
decline in value by 7.5% as a result of a NCLB “failing” school designation, a result 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 2.4, column 2).  Alternatively, homes with 0-2 
bedrooms, which are less likely to be occupied by families with children, see a statistically 
insignificant 5.0% decline (Table 2.4, column 1).  This lack of statistical significance is likely a 
function of a relatively small sample size; only 6,061 0-2 bedroom homes were sold during 
my period of analysis.   
The differential impact of a “failing” designation across number of bedrooms 
suggests that my results are primarily being driven by the buying and selling decisions of 
families with children. 
                                                            
14 Figlio and Lucas (2004) perform a similar analysis in an earlier draft of their paper. 
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2.7.3b Homes Stratified by Neighborhood Income 
To explore the relationship between neighborhood income and the hedonic price of 
a NCLB “failing” school designation, I re-estimate equation (2.2) allowing the coefficient 
attached to the failing indicator to vary across Census block groups.  This yields 48 block 
group specific “failing” school coefficient estimates15, which I then regress on a cubic of 
1999 block group level median household income16.    
Because of a lack of pre-period sorting (discussed in Section 2.5) this two-stage 
regression allows me to estimate the hedonic price of a NCLB “failing” school designation 
across a miscellany of income-taste classes residing in neighborhood, or block group specific 
sub-markets.  It is important to note, that given the possibility of post-announcement 
resorting, these neighborhood, or sub-group specific estimates potentially underestimate the 
true property value impact of a “failing” designation for pre-period occupants.  To clarify, 
assume a representative neighborhood, Park Place, which experiences a “failing” 
announcement.  Prior to the “failing” announcement, neighborhood homes were sold to 
households from the income-taste class with the highest willingness-to-pay for Park Place’s 
unique combination of housing attributes and neighborhood amenities.  In what follows, 
these pre-announcement occupants will be referred to as income-taste class A.   
For sales post-announcement, two possibilities arise: households from income-taste 
class A continue to win the bidding competition for homes in Park Place, or because of a 
large ∆ /∆  relative to competing households, lose the bidding competition resulting in 
                                                            
15To avoid small sample bias, I limit my second stage analysis to block group estimates derived from at 
least 30 sales post‐NCLB “failing” announcement.  This results in 48 observations in the second stage 
regression. 
16 I arrive at a qualitatively similar result when statistically insignificant (pvalue>0.10) first stage coefficient 
estimates are set to zero in the second stage regression. 
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Park Place being re-populated by households in a new income-taste class (subsequently 
referred to as income-taste class B).  It is important to note that prior to the “failing” 
announcement, households in income-taste class B valued Park Place’s unique combination 
of housing attributes and neighborhood amenities less than households in income-class A; 
evidenced by having failed to win the pre-“failing” announcement bidding competition.   
In Figure 2.7, detailing pre and post-“failing” announcement bids for an illustrative 
Park Place house, households from income-taste class A continue to win the bidding 
competition post-“failing” announcement.  If this dynamic holds for all post-announcement 
transactions, the Park Place “failing” coefficient measures the average capitalization of a 
“failing” designation for pre-announcement occupants (income-taste class A).  Figure 2.8 
details pre and post-“failing” announcement bids given re-sorting.  Post-announcement, 
households from income-taste class B win the bidding competition for housing.  If Park 
Place is re-populated by households from income-taste class B, the Park Place “failing” 
coefficient measures a combination of two effects: the difference in income-taste class A and 
income-taste class B’s valuations of Park Place‘s unique combination of housing attributes 
and neighborhood amenities, and the average capitalization of a “failing” designation for 
post-announcement occupants (income-taste class B).  As evidenced in Figure 2.8, to the 
extent this occurs the Park Place “failing” coefficient will underestimate the impact of a 
“failing” designation on pre-announcement occupants.     
Figure 2.9 graphs predicted values of the magnitude of impact of a NCLB “failing” 
designation based upon second stage regression coefficient estimates17.  As illustrated, the 
                                                            
17 It is important to note that given potential omitted variable bias in the second stage regression, any 
estimated relationship between neighborhood income and the hedonic price of NCLB “failing” school 
designation should be interpreted as correlational and not causal. 
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impact of a NCLB “failing” school designation is relatively constant at approximately -6 to -
8% for homes located in block groups with median household incomes between $22,000 to 
$38,000, but then begins to lose magnitude, eventually falling to zero for homes located in 
block groups with median household incomes of $42,00018. 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, while high-income college educated 
households often put significant value on the quality of their children’s education, they are 
also more likely to send their children to private school, moderating the impact of a public 
school “failing” designation19.  High-income college educated households are also potentially 
more likely to research “failing” designations and discover their tenuous connection to 
overall school quality. 
2.7.4 Differential Impact across “Failing” Student Sub-Groups 
 Under NCLB, to achieve adequate yearly progress and avoid a “failing” designation, 
a Title 1 school has to satisfy academic performance targets across a wide array of student 
sub-groups.  If even one of these sub-groups is unable to meet their prescribed performance 
targets, the entire school fails to achieve adequate yearly progress.  After two consecutive 
years of failing to achieve adequate yearly progress, a Title 1 school is deemed “failing.”  
 I investigate whether the impact of a “failing” designation varies by the type and size 
of student sub-group(s) unable to meet prescribed performance targets.  If parents 
sufficiently investigate “failing” designations, a “failure” resulting from a relatively large 
student sub-group like “White” or “Black” unable to meet prescribed performance targets 
                                                            
18 A kernel‐weighted local polynomial regression estimating the regression function underlying the 
relationship between the magnitude of impact of a “failing” designation and 1999 block group level 
median household income yields qualitatively similar results.  The local polynomial regression uses an 
Epanechnikov kernel function and rule of thumb bandwidth selection.  
19 During the 2004‐2005 CMS school year 12.6% of students enrolled in private school.  
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should have a larger impact on property values than a failure resulting from a relatively small 
student sub-group like “Special Education” or “Limited English Proficiency” unable to meet 
prescribed performance targets. 
Re-running equation (2.2) with an additional interaction term, failing x size of non-
performing student sub-group(s), I find that the relative size of the non-performing student sub-
group(s), as measured by its percentage of the total student population, has no statistically 
significant effect on the magnitude of impact of a “failing” designation.  Next, I test for a 
differential impact across student sub-group type by re-running equation (2.2) with failing x 
type of non-performing student sub-group indicators20.  Post estimation, I test the equality of the 
coefficient estimates attached to each interaction term and fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the estimates are equal.   
The lack of sufficient investigation into the varied determinants of a “failing” 
designation is further evidenced by deconstructing the failing indicator into first year failing, 
second year failing x met AYP requirements, and second year failing x did not meet AYP requirements 
and re-running equation (2.2).  A school has to meet AYP requirements for two successive 
years following a “failing” designation to return to non-“failing” status.  As a result, schools 
receiving a “failing” designation in year one, are still considered “failing” in year two, even if 
they meet all AYP requirements (second year failing x met AYP requirements).  If parents 
investigate a school’s AYP student sub-group reports they become aware of this distinction, 
muting the property value impact of a second year of “failing” for improving schools.  I test 
the equality of the coefficient estimates attached to second year failing x met AYP requirements 
and second year failing x did not meet AYP requirements, and fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
                                                            
20 To ensure sufficient cell sizes, a single indicator variable is used for “Limited English Proficient” and 
“Students with Disabilities.”    
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the estimates are equal.  Again, this equality suggests parents fail to sufficiently investigate 
the varied determinants behind a “failing” designation.   
Parental failure to sufficiently investigate the determinants of a “failing” designation 
may be a function of ease of access to necessary information.  A school’s “failing” 
designation is reported in local newspapers and mandated district mailings, while 
information on the “failing” designation’s key determinants, namely the size and type of 
student sub-groups failing to meet prescribed performance targets, is available only after 
navigating through a succession of five links on the North Carolina Public School’s website. 
2.8 Sensitivity Tests 
2.8.1 Testing for Serial Correlation 
 Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that given positive serial correlation in the 
residuals, even clustered standard errors can significantly understate true standard errors 
leading to faulty inference.  Alternatively, negative serial correlation in the residuals can lead 
standard error estimates to overstate true standard errors.   
 Testing for serial correlation in my residuals21, I find a statistically insignificant first 
order autocorrelation coefficient, and a small, negative (-0.037) second order autocorrelation 
coefficient, statistically significant at the 5% level.  This suggests my reported standard errors 
are overly conservative, likely overstating true standard errors.      
 
 
                                                            
21 As in Figlio and Lucas (2004), residuals have been aggregated to the school attendance zone‐month 
level. 
 
27 
 
2.8.2 Testing for Sample Selection Bias 
 To ensure my results are not a product of sample selection where systematically 
different types of homes are sold within a neighborhood prior to and post “failing” 
announcement, I limit my sample to homes sold in 2004, the first year schools received a 
“failing” designation, and test for within neighborhood differences in housing characteristics 
prior to and post “failing” announcement: 
									 	                   (2.5) 
where 	  ∈ .  I run equation (2.5) for the following 
dependent variables: beds, baths, square footage, age, and build quality.  In each instance, the 
coefficient attached to failing is statistically insignificant indicating no substantive difference 
in within neighborhood housing characteristics for homes sold prior to and post “failing” 
announcement.  Taken together, these regression results suggest my findings are not a 
product of sample selection bias. 
2.8.3 Testing for Omitted Variable Bias 
2.8.3a Additional Test Score Measures 
To alleviate the concern that the absence of additional test score measures, although 
weakly correlated with a NCLB “failing” school designation, are biasing estimates I re-
estimate equation (2.2) adding third and fifth grade math and reading proficiency scores22.  I 
again find a negative and statistically significant relationship between the NCLB “failing” 
school designation and property values, with a coefficient estimate of -0.066 (-6.4%) 
                                                            
22 These additional test score measures are highly correlated with average 4th grade math and reading 
proficiency. 
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attached to the “failing” school indicator, a result which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.     
2.8.3b Time Invariant School-level Heterogeneity 
To remove any time invariant school-level heterogeneity, potentially correlated with 
a NCLB “failing” school designation, I re-run equation (2.2) adding elementary school fixed 
effects.  While I still find a negative point estimate, -0.034 (-3.3%) attached to the “failing” 
school indicator, the coefficient estimate does not meet traditional levels of statistical 
significance (pvalue of 0.155).  I attribute this to a loss of variation23.  Furthermore, even 
though the coefficient estimate attached to the “failing” indicator does not meet traditional 
levels of statistical significance, it remains roughly 1.5 times larger than its standard error, 
0.023, indicating an effect remains, albeit measured imprecisely.  It should also be noted, that 
given evidence of negative serial correlation in the residuals, my estimate of the standard 
error is overly conservative and most likely overstates its true value.    
Given the multitude of fixed effects already included in my primary regression, the 
dampened impact of a “failing” designation resulting from the addition of school fixed 
effects is to be expected and should be interpreted as a highly conservative lower bound.    
2.8.4 Border Methodology 
To test the robustness of my results to alternative specifications I limit my sample to 
neighborhoods extending over one or more attendance zone boundaries and re-run equation 
(2.2).  Analysis of this sub-sample is akin to the border methodology identification strategy 
used by Black (1999) with neighborhood-by-year fixed effects acting as time varying 
                                                            
23 As documented in Gujarati’s “Basic Econometrics” (2003). 
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boundary dummies.  These boundary dummies control for unobserved time varying 
characteristics shared by homes on either side of, but adjacent to, elementary attendance 
zone boundaries.   
The success of a border methodology identification strategy in accurately estimating 
the property value impact of school quality hinges on the assumption that neighborhoods 
change continuously over space while school quality changes discontinuously at attendance 
zone boundaries.  To the extent this assumption holds, a border methodology offers an 
attractive option for addressing omitted variable bias.   
Results from the border methodology identification strategy are presented in Table 
2.3, column 3.  As shown, the coefficient estimate attached to the “failing” indicator is equal 
to -0.076 (-7.3%) and statistically significant at the 1% level.  This qualitatively similar result 
demonstrates the robustness of my results to alternative specifications.   
When I re-run this analysis with school fixed effects, the coefficient estimate 
attached to the “failing” indicator drops in magnitude to -0.042 (-4.1%), but remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  Again, given the array of fixed effects and time-
varying school-level controls already included in equation (2.2), this muted impact is largely a 
function of loss of variation and should be interpreted as a lower bound.   
2.8.5 Testing for Differential Pre-period Trends 
To ensure the decrease in value ascribed to a NCLB “failing” school designation is 
valid, and not a function of differential trends in pre-period property value growth, I run a 
falsification test using erroneous announcement dates for a school’s NCLB “failing” school 
designation set two years prior to actual events.  Re-running equation (2.2) with these false 
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dates leads to statistically insignificant results (Table 2.5, column 2).  This suggests my results 
are not a function of differential trends in pre-period property value growth. 
2.9 Conclusion 
Given that several studies have shown publicly available information on school 
quality, most often in the form of test scores, has a significant impact on property values, I 
examine whether the additional information contained in a NCLB “failing” school 
designation is further capitalized into the housing market.   
Employing a highly parameterized model which controls for a series of fixed effects, 
I find that a NCLB “failing” school designation results in a 6.9% decrease in property values 
holding constant other measures of school quality, student characteristics, and neighborhood 
and property attributes.  This decline is statistically significant at the one percent level and 
robust to a number of specifications.   Given average housing prices in “failing” school 
attendance zones, a NCLB “failing” school designation results in a $7,597 decrease in the 
average property value.  In many ways this property value decrease is a product of 
informational inefficiency.  Parents are reacting to the seeming severity of a “failing” 
designation, without understanding its disconnect from overall school quality.  A program 
aimed at eliciting a better understanding of the true nature of a “failing” designation would 
aid in eliminating this market inefficiency. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
3. The Localized Impact of a Homicide on Property Values 
______________________________________________________ 
3.1 Introduction 
Crime is a major societal problem with annual costs estimated in excess of 1.7 trillion 
dollars (Anderson, 1999).  Besides its direct and immediate cost to victims, crime necessitates 
spending on law enforcement, the criminal justice system, private security and incarceration, 
all costly.  In addition, although often overlooked when calculating its economic damage, 
crime can represent a serious neighborhood disamenity which is capitalized into the housing 
market reducing property values. 
Local instances of crime, especially when violent or aggressive in nature, can 
engender a climate of fear among nearby residents reducing perceived neighborhood safety 
and heightening imagined susceptibility to future assault.  In fact, crime can represent such a 
significant disamenity, that area residents are driven to relocate.  Dugan (1999) finds that an 
attack or victimization near one’s residence increases the probability of relocation.  In their 
study of urban flight, Cullen and Levitt (1999) find that high crime cities experience an 
increase in residential exit relative to their low crime counterparts.  They estimate a 10% 
increase in crime results in a 1% decline in city population. 
Beginning with Ridker and Henning (1967), a number of studies have attempted to 
document the impact of crime on property values.  Thaler (1978) was first to empirically 
establish an inverse relationship between crime and property values.  Rizzo (1979) was first 
to instrument for crime in an effort to control for its endogeneity. Since then, instrumental 
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variable identification strategies have been used by Naroff et al (1980),  Burnell  (1988), Buck 
et al (1993), Gibbons (2004), Tita et al (2006), Pope et al (2009), and Mayock et al (2010).  
In this paper, I examine the property value impact of a local homicide, but, because 
of the difficulty and often poor defensibility24 of instrumental variable approaches I confront 
the potential endogeneity of the crime variable with an alternative methodology as proposed 
by Linden and Rockoff (2008).  Employing a difference-in-difference identification strategy, 
I exploit a unique dataset containing dates and locations of Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina homicides to examine variation of property values, pre and post murder, within 500 
feet and 500-1,000 feet of a homicide, a small homogenous area characterized by similar 
neighborhood and housing attributes.  In this way, I control for un-observed time varying 
neighborhood level heterogeneity, which might otherwise bias my estimates.   
I estimate that homes sold within 500 feet of a homicide fall in value by 13.4% in the 
year following the crime.  This sharp localized decline in home prices post homicide is 
evident in Figure 3.1, which depicts the results of a kernel-weighted local polynomial 
regression of home sales pre and post homicide for homes located within 500 feet and 500-
1,000 feet of a homicide.  Sale prices for homes located within 500 feet of a homicide 
dropped sharply post homicide, while sale prices of homes located 500-1,000 feet of a 
homicide maintained their pre-homicide trajectory.   
My paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I provide a theoretical 
framework for my analysis; I then describe the data used and discuss my empirical 
                                                            
24 With a just identified model, there is no test for an instrument’s exogeneity and one can often 
tell a story, which calls the author’s exclusion restriction(s) into serious question. 
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methodology; this is followed by a results section, a series of falsification tests, and a brief 
conclusion.     
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
This section presents the conceptual framework supporting my hypothesis that a 
local homicide lowers residential property values via a decrease in perceived neighborhood 
safety.   
Following Ross and Yinger (1999), I make the following assumptions: 
 Household utility depends on housing services, H, a vector of neighborhood 
amenities, S, and a numeraire good, Z.  
 Households are perfectly mobile and all households are homeowners. 
 Each household is grouped into a particular income-taste class, and because 
of perfect mobility, households in the same income-taste class share the same 
level of utility,	 .  
Households maximize their utility function, , , , with respect to the 
following budget constraint: 
																	 	 1
	
1 ∗ 																													 3.1  
where  is household income, P is the price per unit of housing services H,  is the effective 
tax, V is home value,  is the discount rate, and ∗ is equal to / . 
3.2.1 Household Bidding 
Solving equation (3.1) for P leads to the following household maximization problem, 
indicating a household’s maximum willingness to bid for a unit of household services: 
 
34 
 
 
															 , 			 ∗ 							 	 	 , , 																																						 3.2  
Setting up the Lagrange function and taking derivatives with respect to Z and H 
yields the following first order conditions: 
																																							
1 ∗
0																																																										 3.3  
																																								
1
1 ∗
0																																																											 3.4  
Solving equation (3.3) for	 , and substituting the solution into equation (3.4) results 
in the following maximization condition: 
																																																		 / 1 ∗ 																																																															 3.5  
To maximize utility, households choose H and Z such that	 / 1 ∗ .  
Since  is equal to one, this simplifies to choosing H and Z such that the marginal benefit 
of H (in dollar terms) is equal to its marginal cost.   
Let  equal perceived neighborhood safety, which decreases in the event of a local 
homicide, LH.  Prior to a local homicide (LH=0), a household chooses  units of housing 
services,  units of a numeraire good, and achieves utility level	  as illustrated in Figure 
3.2.  Now assume	∆ /∆ ∆ /∆ ∗ ∆ /∆ 0, or household utility decreases in 
the event of a local homicide as a result of a decrease in perceived neighborhood safety.  
After a local homicide (LH=1),	 , , | 1 	< , , | 0  .  In order 
for households to achieve	 , ensuring locational equilibrium, H and/or Z must increase as 
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represented by a rightward shift in the 	indifference curve as illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
Since  is fixed at one, households can only reach this higher indifference curve by 
decreasing P, their bid per unit of housing services. 
Given ∆ /∆ ,	the property value impact of a local homicide can be calculated as 
follows: 
                                  		∆ /∆ ∆ /∆ ∗ /                                         (3.6) 
It is important to note that ∆ /∆  will vary across income-taste classes based 
upon each group’s income and preferences.  A standard property value hedonic will identify 
the average housing market impact of a local homicide, ∑ ∆ /∆ , where  indexes 
individual households. 
3.2.2 Household Sorting 
 Assume a homicide occurs in a representative neighborhood, Park Place.  Prior to 
the local homicide ( 0), homes were sold to households from the income-taste class 
with the highest willingness-to-pay for Park Place’s unique combination of housing attributes 
and neighborhood amenities.  In what follows, these pre-homicide occupants will be referred 
to as income-taste class A.   
For sales post-homicide, two possibilities arise: households from income-taste class 
A continue to win the bidding competition for homes in Park Place, or because of a large 
∆ /∆  relative to competing households, lose the bidding competition resulting in Park 
Place being re-populated by households from a new income-taste class (subsequently 
referred to as income-taste class B).  It is important to note that prior to the homicide, 
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households in income-taste class B valued Park Place’s unique combination of housing 
attributes and neighborhood amenities less than households in income-class A; evidenced by 
having failed to win the pre-homicide bidding competition.   
In Figure 3.4, detailing pre and post-homicide bids for an illustrative Park Place 
house, households from income-taste class A continue to win the bidding competition post-
homicide.  If this dynamic holds for all post-homicide transactions,  ∑ ∆ /∆  
measures the average capitalization of a local homicide for pre-homicide occupants (income-
taste class A).  Figure 3.5 details pre and post-homicide bids given re-sorting.  Post-
homicide, households from income-taste class B win the bidding competition for housing.  
If Park Place is re-populated by households from income-taste class B, ∑ ∆ /∆  
measures a combination of two effects: the difference in income-taste class A and income-
taste class B’s valuations of Park Place’s unique combination of housing attributes and 
neighborhood amenities, and the average capitalization of a local homicide for the new, 
post-homicide occupants (income-taste class B).  As evidenced in Figure 3.5, to the extent 
this occurs ∑ ∆ /∆  will underestimate the impact of a homicide on pre-homicide 
occupants.   
3.3 Data 
Focusing on Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, my analysis draws on two 
datasets: county tax assessor data and the dates and locations of homicides in Mecklenburg 
County from 2001 through 2004 collected from the Charlotte Observer.     
The tax assessor data provides information on the locations, characteristics, and sale 
dates and prices, normalized to December 2004 dollars, of all properties sold within 
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Mecklenburg County from 2000 to 2004.  The data includes comprehensive building 
characteristics including the year built, the number of bedrooms and baths, two measures of 
build quality, and the type of build materials used.  Within the data, homes are separated into 
1,004 neighborhoods characterized by similarly valued, homogenous properties.  These 
neighborhoods are extremely small, on average only 0.47 square miles; much smaller than 
census block groups.  In 2000 there were 373 census block groups in Mecklenburg County 
and 1,004 tax assessor defined neighborhoods.  
The dates and locations of homicides were collected from the Charlotte Observer, the 
major daily newspaper for Mecklenburg County.  Whenever a death in the county was 
investigated as a homicide, the Charlotte Observer would run a short piece in the Metro section 
of the paper providing summary details on the case.  These included the date of the incident 
and its exact or approximate location.  The Charlotte Observer reported a total of 203 unique 
homicide date/locations from 2001 to 2004.  Out of the 203 unique date/locations, the 
newspaper provided sufficiently detailed location information on 173 date/locations.   
As a result, I am only able to successfully identify the dates and locations for 
approximately 85% of the reported homicides in Mecklenburg County from 2001 to 2004.  
Although this is not ideal, to the extent that real estate sales are driven by out of 
neighborhood moves, and potential buyers get their news from the same information 
sources I investigate, we are similarly hampered.  In other words, the majority of potential 
buyers are making their decisions based upon the same information set I draw from.  Figure 
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3.6 illustrates the 173 successfully identified locations of reported homicides in Mecklenburg 
County from 2001 to 200425. 
To construct my analysis sample, I combine my two datasets by matching reported 
homicides to property sales.  For each property sale, I identify all homicides occurring within 
1,000 feet of the property and within a 2 year window (1 year prior and 1 year post) of the 
sale date.  The resulting sample has 840 sales matched to a homicide and 86,777 unmatched 
sales.  Sales outside the range of $5,000 to $1 million dollars (representing the 1st and 99th 
percentile of the price distribution) are dropped.   
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of various characteristics of the properties sold 
within Mecklenburg County from 2000 to 2004.  The first column provides information on 
all sales within the County, and the second provides information on sales of homes within 
1,000 feet of a homicide occurring within a 2 year window of the sale date (from now on 
simply referred to as matched home sales within 1,000 feet of a homicide).   We see that 
matched homes within 1,000 feet of a homicide are substantively smaller, have a lower build 
quality rating and sell for approximately $94,000 less than homes in our larger sample of 
sales across Mecklenburg County.  These differences serve to demonstrate the importance of 
properly controlling for the endogeneity of the location of a homicide when assessing its 
impact on property values.   
 
                                                            
25 When information as to the location of a homicide was provided at the block level I linked it to 
the middle of the block, in this way minimizing any potential spatial mismeasurement.  For example, if the 
Charlotte Observer reported that a homicide had occurred on the 500 block of Genesee Street, which runs 
from 500 to 599, I assigned the homicide to 550 Genesee Street.  Using this simple method of imputation, 
I  calculate  an  average maximum  potential measurement  error  of  approximately  141  feet  for  the  173 
successfully identified homicides.   
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3.4 Empirical Methodology  
As mentioned, a major concern in estimating the relationship between crime and 
property values is properly controlling for the endogeneity of the crime variable.  In cross-
sectional data, geographic variation in the crime rate is most likely correlated with un-
observables which also impact property values.  In time series data, changes in the crime rate 
are potentially linked to changes in neighborhood composition and other time varying 
neighborhood characteristics.   
In an effort to control for this endogeneity, a number of studies have adopted 
instrumental variable identification strategies.  These studies include Rizzo (1979), Naroff et 
al (1980),  Burnell  (1988), Buck et al (1993), Gibbons (2004), Tita et al (2006), Pope et al 
(2009), and Mayock et al (2010).  Out of these eight studies, half fail to test for the validity of 
their instruments, and among the four that do, one offers an overidentification test which 
rejects the exogeneity of the proposed instruments (Mayock and Ihlanfeldt, 2010).  This is in 
no way a condemnation of previous work on the subject, but simply an indication of how 
difficult it is to identify instruments which are both strongly correlated with crime and 
plausibly excludable from the primary home price hedonic regression.    
Because of the difficulty and often poor defensibility of instrumental variable 
approaches I confront the potential endogeneity of the crime variable with an empirical 
methodology originally proposed by Linden and Rockoff (2008) in their paper estimating the 
impact of registered sex offenders on local property values.  Employing a difference-in-
difference identification strategy, I exploit a unique dataset containing dates and locations of 
Mecklenburg County homicides to examine variation in property values, pre and post 
murder, within 500 feet and 500-1,000 feet of a homicide - a small homogenous area 
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characterized by similar neighborhood and housing attributes.  In this way, I control for un-
observed time varying neighborhood level heterogeneity, which might otherwise bias my 
estimates. 
Like Linden and Rockoff’s analysis, the efficacy of my proposed estimation strategy 
centers on the relative similarity of matched homes sold within 500 feet and 500-1,000 feet 
of a homicide.  Figure 7 depicts homes within 500 feet and 500-1,000 feet of a homicide to 
indicate just how closely these two cohorts are grouped.  I test the cross-sectional difference 
between these two groups of homes with the following regression: 
                                            log                                         3.7  
where  is the sales price of home i in “neighborhood” j at time t,  is a non-parametric 
neighborhood time trend, and  is an indicator variable for matched homes sold within 
500 feet of a homicide.   
By limiting my sample to matched home sales within 1,000 feet of the murder and 
working with only pre-period data, equation (3.7) allows me to examine whether home prices 
significantly differed with distance to the future site of the murder.  I also test for the 
similarity of other neighborhood amenities as well as structural attributes by including each 
measure as the dependent variable in equation (3.7) and performing the same analysis.   
   If any cross-sectional differences exist, I can control for them with the following 
difference-in-difference model, again proposed by Linden and Rockoff, which I use to 
estimate the impact of a murder on property values: 
log ∗
																																				                                                                                     (3.8) 
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where  is a non-parametric neighborhood-time trend,  is a vector of housing 
characteristics specific to home i,  is an indicator variable for matched homes sold 
within 1,000 feet of a homicide, and  is an indicator for time periods post homicide26. 
3.5 Estimation Results  
3.5.1 Differences in Pre-Period Characteristics 
3.5.1a Homes Sold within 500 feet of a Homicide relative to All County Sales 
To investigate the average pre-period price difference between homes sold within 
500 feet of a homicide and homes sold within the same neighborhood and in the same year, 
I estimate equation (3.7) using all Mecklenburg County home sales (Table 3.3, column 1).  
The coefficient estimate attached to the indicator variable  is not statistically significant 
indicating that homes sold close to the future site of a homicide were, on average, no more 
or less expensive then unmatched homes sold within the same neighborhood during the 
same year.  
                                                            
26 There is a degree of imprecision in identifying the exact location of many of the homicides in 
my dataset; I calculate an average maximum potential measurement error of approximately 141 feet for 
the 173 successfully identified homicides.  Fortunately, given my difference‐in‐difference strategy such 
imprecision in identifying the exact location of a homicide should downward bias any estimated impact on 
property values.   
Take my previous example of a homicide reported on the 500 block of Genesee Street.  I assign 
the homicide an imputed location of 550 Genesee Street and construct my indicator variables for homes 
sold within 500 feet and 500‐1000 feet of 550 Genesee Street.  If the homicide actually occurred at 595 
Genesee, many of the homes assigned to the within 500‐1000 feet group will actually be situated much 
closer to the site of the homicide, potentially within 500 feet.   
If we assume a homicide leads to a 10% drop in post period property values for homes within 
500 feet, the homes mistakenly assigned to the 500‐1000 feet group will see a significant drop in value.  
As a result, the difference‐in‐difference estimator, which calculates the differential impact in post period 
prices between homes located within 500 feet and homes located within 500‐1000 feet, will return a 
downward biased estimate. 
 
42 
 
3.5.1b Homes Sold within 500 feet a Homicide relative to Homes Sold within 500 to 
1,000 Feet of a Homicide 
 Next, I limit my sample to pre-period sales of homes within 1,000 feet of a future 
homicide and re-estimate equation (3.7).  The resulting coefficient estimates provide pre-
period cross-sectional differences between matched homes sold within 500 feet and 500-
1,000 feet of a homicide.   
The coefficient estimates presented in Table 3.2 present differences in log sales price, 
age, square footage, number of bedrooms, and numbers of bathrooms – none of which are 
statistically significant.  These results demonstrate the relative pre-period homogeneity of 
homes sold within 500 feet and 500-1,000 feet of a future homicide. 
3.5.2 The Impact of a Homicide 
To investigate the property value impact of a homicide, I begin by estimating a 
simple pre-post comparison using equation (3.8), but excluding an indicator variable for 
homes sold within 1,000 feet of a homicide (Table 3.3, column 2).  I find that homes sold 
within 500 feet of a homicide declined in price by 10.2%27 post homicide relative to homes 
sold within the same neighborhood in the same year, a result statistically significant at the 
5% level.   
Next, I re-estimate equation (3.8) with an indicator variable for homes sold within 
1,000 feet of a homicide.  Again, controlling for household and time varying neighborhood-
                                                            
27 Because  ∗  is a binary measure, its correlation coefficient measures	∆log /∆	 ∗
.  This can be re‐expressed as follows:   log , , 	/	 1 0 log ,
, .  Exponentiating, subtracting one from each side, and multiplying by 100 yields:  exp
1 ∗ 100 , , ∗ 100/ , , or the percentage change in sales price due to proximity to a 
homicide.   
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level heterogeneity, I find that homes located within 500 feet of a homicide declined in value 
by 13.4% post homicide relative to homes located between 500-1,000 feet of the homicide, a 
result statistically significant at the 5% level (Table 3.3, column 3). 
3.5.2a Varying Impact at Different Points along the Property Value Distribution 
To investigate whether a homicide has an equal impact across heterogeneous 
properties, I run a simultaneous quantile regression, which estimates the impact of a 
homicide at different points along Mecklenburg County’s property value distribution, with 
results illustrated in Figure 3.8.  Because of computational constraints, this regression 
includes neighborhood and year fixed effects instead of neighborhood-by-year fixed effects.   
Interestingly, the property value impact of a homicide appears relatively uniform 
across homes with only slightly larger coefficient estimates at the upper end of the property 
value distribution.  This differential, albeit slight, is intuitively appealing. More expensive 
homes are likely to be located in affluent, low crime neighborhoods where a local homicide 
represents a jarring divergence from the status quo, leading to a large change in perceived 
neighborhood safety.  Alternatively less expensive homes are likely to be located in poor, 
high crime neighborhoods already mired in some degree of violence, where a local homicide 
fails to provide as striking a signal, leading to only a small change in perceived neighborhood 
safety.  I more fully investigate this dynamic in section 3.5.3 (Differential Impact across High 
and Low Crime Areas).         
3.5.2b Attenuation with Distance from a Homicide 
To examine how the impact of a homicide attenuates with geographic distance from 
the crime, I interact ∗  with a fourth order polynomial of distance and graph the 
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results in Figure 3.928.  As illustrated, the impact of a homicide appears relatively uniform for 
homes located within 500 feet of the crime with the exception of a -22.3% estimated impact 
at 200 feet.  I attribute this anomaly to a paucity of relevant post-period sales at this distance 
and interpret the deviation from an otherwise uniform trend as noise resulting from small 
sample bias.   
Discounting this aberration, these results suggest that for homes located within 500 
feet of a crime, distance fails to play a substantive role in ameliorating the fear, anxiety and 
decrease in perceived neighborhood safety associated with a nearby homicide.  As a 
neighborhood resident living within 500 feet of recent homicide, there is no consolation 
living three, as opposed to two, houses down from site of the crime.  Within such a short 
distance residents feel equally vulnerable.   
3.5.2c Attenuation with Time since a Homicide 
To investigate how the impact of a homicide attenuates with time, I interact ∗
 with a second order polynomial of days since the crime and graph the resulting 
coefficient estimates in Figure 3.1029.  
As illustrated, the impact of a homicide is greatest immediately after the crime, but 
relatively short lived.  Thirty days post-homicide homes within 500 feet are devalued by an 
estimated 18.8% relative to homes 500-1,000 feet of the crime.  Sixty days post, property 
values have already began to recover among homes within 500 feet devalued by 13.4% 
relative to homes within 500-1,000 feet of the crime.  As more time passes, police 
investigations are concluded and the homicide fades from the public consciousness.  
                                                            
28 Higher order polynomials fail to improve upon the model’s explanatory power.  
29 Again, higher order polynomials were tested, but they failed to improve upon the model’s explanatory 
power. 
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Property values for homes within 500 feet continue to recover.  One hundred twenty days 
after the crime, homes within 500 feet are devalued by 6.1% relative to homes within 500-
1,000 feet and by six months, homes within 500 feet are devalued by only 4.6% relative to 
homes 500-1,000 feet of the crime30.  
3.5.3 Differential Impact across High and Low Crime Areas 
 To investigate whether the impact of a homicide differs across high and low crime 
areas, I subdivide my sales data into two samples, one characterized by relatively high pre-
period crime31 and one characterized by relatively low pre-period crime, and re-run equation 
(3.8).  I find that in areas characterized by low levels of pre-period crime, homes located 
within 500 feet of a homicide saw a 25.5% decline in property values post homicide relative 
to homes between 500-1,000 feet of a homicide, a drop in value which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (Table 3.4, column 1).  Alternatively, in areas characterized by high 
levels of pre-period crime, homes located within 500 feet of a homicide saw a statistically 
insignificant 9.4% decline in property values post homicide relative to homes between 500 
and 1,000 feet of a homicide (Table 3.4, column 2).  
Again, such a result is intuitively appealing, suggesting a local homicide has a 
differential impact on perceived neighborhood safety in low and high crime neighborhoods.  
                                                            
30 Interestingly, after regaining much of their value six months post homicide; homes within 500 feet 
begin to again lose value relative to homes 500‐1,000 feet of the crime.  This may be a function of 
additional, lesser crimes being committed in the same area post homicide, potentially spurred on by the 
original crime, and leading to a second wave of sales as perceived neighborhood safety among residents is 
further eroded.  Unfortunately, given data constraints, the basis of this second order effect cannot be 
further investigated.  Furthermore, it is important to note that since sales are assigned to homicides up to 
one year post, this second order effect is included when calculating the overall property value impact of a 
homicide.  But, an alternative specification where sales are only associated with homicides up to six 
months post, capturing just the first order effect, yields a qualitatively similar result, π (D ∗ Post ) =       
‐0.128*.    
31 The level of pre‐period crime is calculated from year 2000 census tract crime rates. 
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In addition, further amplifying the divergent effect, households that sort into low crime 
neighborhoods are more likely to have a higher willingness to pay for perceived 
neighborhood safety than households that sort into high crime neighborhoods.   
To better understand how the impact of a homicide varies across high and low crime 
areas, I subdivide my sales data by the level of pre-period property and violent crime and re-
run equation (3.8).  In areas characterized by low levels of pre-period property crime, homes 
located within 500 feet of a homicide decline in value by 27.4% post homicide relative to 
homes between 500-1,000 feet of a homicide, an impact significant at the 1% level (Table 
3.4, column 3).  Alternatively, in areas characterized by high levels of pre-period property 
crime, homes located within 500 feet of a homicide decline in value by a statistically 
insignificant 9.3% post homicide relative to homes between 500-1,000 feet of a homicide 
(Table 3.4, column 4).   
Interestingly, point estimates for areas characterized by differing levels of pre-period 
violent crime, are relatively similar (Table 3.4, columns 4-5).  To the extent lesser forms of 
violent crime, even when successfully prosecuted, are not as visible as destruction of 
property, vandalism, break-ins, and thefts, the differential impact of a local homicide on 
perceived neighborhood safety will be larger for areas characterized by low vs. high property 
crime rather than areas characterized by low vs. high violent crime.     
3.6 Sensitivity Tests 
3.6.1 Homicide Area by Year Fixed Effects 
Confining my sample to homes sold within 2,000 feet of a homicide, I re-estimate 
equation (3.8), but replace neighborhood-by-year fixed effects with homicide area by year 
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fixed effects.  In this way, I control for variation specific to areas surrounding each 
homicide.  This specification also allows me to test an assumption implicit to my larger 
estimation strategy, namely that the relationship between housing characteristics and prices 
for homes located farther afield, outside the proximate area of a homicide, are helpful in 
estimating the relationship between housing characteristics and prices for homes located 
within close proximity of a homicide.  Running this specification yields results consistent 
with my previous estimates suggesting that using additional data from sales outside a 2,000 
foot radius of a homicide does not bias my estimates.   
3.6.2 Test of Residual Means 
As a further refinement and additional test of the applicability of using data from this 
larger cohort of homes, I investigate whether homes located within 1,000 feet of a homicide 
are characterized by lower quality un-observables by performing a t-test on the equality of 
residual means from a hedonic price regression for homes located inside and outside a 1,000 
foot radius of a homicide.  I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of equal residual means 
across the two groups.  Again, this suggests that using additional sales data does not bias my 
results.  
3.6.3 Falsification Tests 
Although my analysis shows little evidence of preexisting differences in homes 
located within 500 feet and 500-1,000 feet of a homicide, hypothetically the decrease in value 
ascribed to a homicide could be a function of differential trends in property value growth 
leading to a spurious result.   
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I check for this possibility by running a series of falsification tests using erroneous 
homicide dates set one and two years prior to dates of actual events.  Re-running my 
difference-in-difference specification with these false dates leads to statistically insignificant 
results (Table 3.5, column 2).  In other words, I find no evidence of a spurious effect. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Employing a difference-in-difference methodology, I exploit a unique dataset 
containing dates and locations of reported homicides in Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina to examine variation in property values, pre and post murder, within 500 feet and 
500-1000 feet of a homicide, a small homogenous area characterized by similar 
neighborhood and housing attributes.    I estimate that homes sold within 500 feet of a 
homicide fall by roughly 13.4% in the year following the crime.  Given average housing 
prices in Mecklenburg County, this represents a $15,290 average property value decline.   
A homicide’s short-lived, but significant property value effect provides evidence of 
the myopic and highly reactive nature of the real estate market.  Buyers and sellers appear 
easily swayed in their perception of the underlying safety of a neighborhood immediately 
following a homicide, but within six months these fears seem to have largely evaporated as 
evidenced by a lack of long-term capitalization. 
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________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Anti-Islamic Sentiment and its Impact on Residential 
Property Values 
______________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 On September 11th, 2001, America suffered one of the worst terrorist attacks in the 
nation’s history.  Four passenger-filled commercial airliners were hijacked by members of Al 
Qaeda and in an act of Jihad, intentionally crashed killing all onboard.  Two airliners hit the 
Twin Towers, a third hit the Pentagon, and a fourth was brought down in rural Pennsylvania 
during a passenger insurrection while on its way to the White House.  These unanticipated 
attacks claimed almost 3,000 lives and hundreds of billions of dollars of economic damage. 
 Following the attacks, anti-Islamic sentiment significantly increased within the 
United States.  The FBI reported a 17-fold increase in crimes directed at Muslims nationwide 
during 2001.  In addition, Arab and Muslim groups reported over 2,000 incidents of 
September 11th related backlash.  An ABC poll conducted in January 2002 reported that 14% 
of respondents believed mainstream Islam supported violence towards non-members.   
By September 2003, this number had increased to 34%, indicating over 1/3 of the 
US population believed Islam promoted violence against the West.  A June 2003 Pew 
Research Study released similar findings: 49% of Americans believed a significant portion of 
Muslims held anti-American views.  Even three years later, misperception and fear persisted. 
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In March 2006, an ABC poll reported 33% of Americans believed mainstream Islam 
advocated violence towards non-members. 
   In this paper, I examine the impact of the post September 11th, 2001 increase in 
anti-Islamic sentiment on property values.  Specifically, I analyze whether, after the terrorist 
attacks, homes within close proximity to a mosque dropped in value.  Using a difference-in-
difference methodology, I find that after the terrorist attacks, homes located within 1,000 
feet of a mosque decreased in value by over 17% relative to homes located between 1,000-
2,000 feet of a mosque.  This decline in value is statistically significant at the one percent 
level and robust to a number of specifications.   
4.2 Literature Review 
This section examines recent empirical work on the economic effects of terrorism, 
the majority of which has focused on terrorism’s impact on broader economic measures 
such as GDP growth and stock market returns.     
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) estimate the economic effects of terrorism on the 
Basque region of Spain using a synthetic control, or weighted combination of other Spanish 
regions with little to no exposure to terrorism.  The authors compare the economic 
evolution of this synthetic control to that of the Basque region, attributing any differences in 
GDP per capita between the two regions to the negative effects of terrorism.  They estimate 
that the Basque region lost 10% of real GDP due to terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s.  In an 
even broader analysis, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2007) examine the relationship between the 
risk of terrorism and net foreign direct investment in 110 countries.  They find that a one 
standard deviation increase in the risk of terrorism decreases net foreign direct investment by 
approximately 5% of GDP, equivalent to 16 billion 2003 US dollars. 
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Eldor and Melnick (2004) and Eckstein and Tsiddon (2003) investigate the impact of 
terrorism on the Israeli economy.  Focusing on the period 1990-2003, during which Israel 
experienced 639 terrorist attacks resulting in 1,212 deaths and over 5,700 injuries, Eldor and 
Melnick (2004) estimate a 30% decline in the value of the Tel Aviv Stock Market 100 Index 
as a result of terrorism.  Eckstein and Tsiddon (2003) use quarterly data to examine the 
impact of terror on GNP and find that, in the absence of terrorist attacks from the third 
quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2004, the Israeli economy would have grown by an 
additional 4%.     
In the study most closely linked to my own, Gautier et al (2009) examine the effects 
of terrorism at a more localized level.  Employing a difference-in-difference identification 
strategy, the authors compare house prices in Amsterdam neighborhoods with more than 
25% Moroccan and Turkish inhabitants with house prices in other Amsterdam 
neighborhoods before and after the murder of Theo van Gogh.   
The murder of filmmaker van Gogh was religiously motivated, committed by a 26-
year old Dutchman of Moroccan origin who had recently converted to radical Islam.  A 
wave of national outrage and increased racial tension followed the murder.  A survey 
conducted shortly after the crime found that 86% of respondents believed the murder had 
negatively impacted the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims.  The authors 
investigate whether this change in public opinion had an impact on house prices and find 
that relative house prices in neighborhoods characterized by more than 25% Moroccan and 
Turkish inhabitants decreased by approximately 2.4% in the year following the Theo van 
Gogh murder.   
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4.3 Theoretical Framework 
This section presents the conceptual framework supporting my hypothesis that post 
terrorist attacks, residential properties within close proximity to a mosque decreased in value 
relative to residential properties located farther afield.   
Following Ross and Yinger (1999), I make the following assumptions: 
 Household utility depends on housing services, H, a vector of neighborhood 
amenities, S, and a numeraire good, Z.  
 Households are perfectly mobile and all households are homeowners. 
 Each household is grouped into a particular income-taste class, and because 
of perfect mobility, households in the same income-taste class share the same 
level of utility,	 .  
Households maximize their utility function, , , , with respect to the 
following budget constraint: 
																			 	 1
	
1 ∗ 																											 4.1  
where  is household income, P is the price per unit of housing services H,  is the effective 
tax, V is home value,  is the discount rate, and ∗ is equal to / . 
4.3.1 Household Bidding 
Solving equation (4.1) for P leads to the following household maximization problem, 
indicating a household’s maximum willingness to bid for a unit of household services: 
															 , 			 ∗ 							 	 	 , , 																																						 4.2  
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Setting up the Lagrange function and taking derivatives with respect to Z and H 
yields the following first order conditions: 
																																											
1 ∗
0																																																							 4.3  
																																													
1
1 ∗
0																																																								 4.4  
Solving equation (4.3) for	 , and substituting the solution into equation (4.4) results 
in the following maximization condition: 
																																																			 / 1 ∗ 																																																																	 4.5  
To maximize utility, households choose H and Z such that	 / 1 ∗ .  
Since  is equal to one, this simplifies to choosing H and Z such that the marginal benefit 
of H (in dollar terms) is equal to its marginal cost.   
Let 	indicate close proximity to a mosque, 	equal the level of pre-9/11 anti-
Islamic sentiment, and 	equal the level of post-9/11 anti-Islamic sentiment, where	 	
.  Prior to the terrorist attacks, given close proximity to a mosque ( 	 1) a household 
chooses  units of housing services,  units of a numeraire good, and achieves utility 
level	  as illustrated in Figure 4.1.  Now assume	∆ /∆ | 	 1 0, or, given close 
proximity to a mosque, household utility decreases with anti-Islamic sentiment.  Post 
terrorist attacks,	 , , 	 1, 	 , , 	 1, 	 	 .  In order for 
households in close proximity to a mosque to achieve	 , ensuring locational equilibrium, H 
and/or Z must increase as represented by a rightward shift in the 	indifference curve as 
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illustrated in Figure 4.2.  Since  is fixed at one, households can only reach this higher 
indifference curve by decreasing P, their bid per unit of housing services. 
Given ∆ /∆ ,	the property value impact of a post-September 11th increase in anti-
Islamic sentiment can be calculated as follows: 
                                		∆ /∆ ∆ /∆ ∗ /                                              (4.6) 
It is important to note that ∆ /∆  will vary across income-taste classes based upon 
each group’s income and preferences.  A standard property value hedonic will identify the 
average housing market impact of a post-September 11th increase in anti-Islamic sentiment, 
∑ ∆ /∆ , where  indexes individual households. 
4.3.2 Household Sorting 
 Assume a representative neighborhood, Park Place, in close proximity to a mosque.  
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, neighborhood homes were sold to 
households from the income-taste class with the highest willingness-to-pay for Park Place’s 
unique combination of housing attributes and neighborhood amenities.  In what follows, 
these pre-attack occupants will be referred to as income-taste class A.   
For sales post-attacks, two possibilities arise: households from income-taste class A 
continue to win the bidding competition for homes in Park Place, or because of a large 
∆ /∆  relative to competing households, lose the bidding competition resulting in Park 
Place being re-populated by households in a new income-taste class (subsequently referred 
to as income-taste class B).  It is important to note that prior to the terrorist attacks, 
households in income-taste class B valued Park Place’s unique combination of housing 
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attributes and neighborhood amenities less than households in income-class A; evidenced by 
having failed to win the pre-attack bidding competition.   
In Figure 4.3, detailing pre and post-announcement bids for an illustrative Park Place 
house, households from income-taste class A continue to win the bidding competition post-
attacks.  If this dynamic holds for all post-attack transactions,  ∑ ∆ /∆  measures the 
average capitalization of a post-September 11th increase in anti-Islamic sentiment for pre-
attack occupants (income-taste class A).  Figure 4.4 details pre and post-attack bids given re-
sorting.  Post-attack, households from income-taste class B win the bidding competition for 
housing.  If Park Place is re-populated by households from income-taste class B, ∑ ∆ /
∆  measures a combination of two effects: the difference in income-taste class A and 
income-taste class B’s valuations of Park Place‘s unique combination of housing attributes 
and neighborhood amenities, and the average capitalization of a post-September 11th 
increase in anti-Islamic sentiment for post-attack occupants (income-taste class B).  As 
evidenced in Figure 4.4, to the extent this occurs ∑ ∆ /∆  will underestimate the 
impact of a post-September 11th increase in anti-Islamic sentiment on pre-attack occupants.   
4.4 Data 
Focusing on Baltimore, Maryland, my analysis draws on two datasets: the first, a 
compendium of disaggregated tax assessor data, and the second, the location of all Baltimore 
mosques continuously operating from 1998 to 2007.     
The tax assessor data provides information on the locations, characteristics, and sale 
dates and prices, normalized to December 2008 dollars, of all residential properties sold 
within Baltimore from 1998 to 2007.  The data includes comprehensive building 
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characteristics including the year built, the square footage and number of stories, a measure 
of build quality, and the type of build materials used.  Sales outside the range of $5,000 to $1 
million dollars are dropped and the resulting sample consists of 146,050 observations.    
The locations of mosques continuously operating from 1998-2007 were collected by 
taking the intersection, or set of all mosques as defined by name and location, present in 
both a 1998 and a current year compendium of religious institutions in the United States. 
To construct my analysis sample, I combine my two datasets by matching mosques 
to property sales.  For each property sale, I identify all mosques within 2,000 feet of the 
property.  The resulting sample has 1,054 sales matched to a mosque and 144,996 
unmatched sales. 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of various characteristics of the properties sold 
within Baltimore from 1998 to 2007.  The first column provides information on all sales 
within Baltimore, and the second provides information on sales of homes within 2,000 feet 
of a mosque.   We see that homes within 2,000 feet of a mosque have fewer stories and sell 
for approximately $19,000 less than homes in our larger sample of sales across greater 
Baltimore.  Interestingly, build quality and age are relatively similar across the two cohorts.   
4.5 Empirical Methodology 
 This section presents the empirical framework and develops the motivation behind 
my difference-in-difference specification. 
Let  equal the period	  sales price of home	  located within 1,000 feet of a 
mosque, post terrorist attacks.  The sales price for the same home in the absence of the 
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terrorist attacks is defined as	 .  Given these two prices, the impact of anti-Islamic 
sentiment engendered by the terrorist attacks for home  can be computed as	 .   
The average impact across affected homes can be calculated as	 |
1 , where PROX=1 denotes homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque.  Unfortunately, 
the counterfactual  is not observed precluding direct estimation of	 | 1 .   
To estimate this counterfactual mean, I define two alternative comparison groups: all 
remaining homes in greater Baltimore and homes located within 1,000-2,000 feet of a 
mosque, as depicted in Figure 4.5.  Let PROX=1 denote homes located within 1,000 feet of 
a mosque and PROX=0 the respective comparison group.    
Define 0 as the period prior to the terrorist attacks and 1 as the period 
after.  By assuming a common trend, later formally tested, in the rate of property value 
growth between these two cohorts of homes in the absence of the terrorist attacks, the 
missing counterfactual can be replaced by: 
																		 1, 1 1, 0 																											 4.7  
where  is the aggregate rate of property value growth among homes in the comparison 
group, 
																				 0, 1 0, 0 																									 4.8  
Given this framework, | 1  can be computed with a difference-
in-difference estimator.  Controlling for individual-level structural characteristics and 
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neighborhood32 by year fixed effects, my initial specification compares post 9/11 changes in 
sales price between homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque and all other homes within 
greater Baltimore:  
																		log , , ∗                     4.9  
where  is the sales price of home i in census tract j at time t.   is a neighborhood-time 
trend,  is a vector of housing characteristics,  is an indicator variable for homes sold 
within 1,000 feet of a mosque, and  is an indicator variable for time periods post 9/11. 
 The coefficient  measures the differential impact, or Post 9/11 percentage change 
in housing prices, for homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque relative to all other 
homes within greater Baltimore.  The consistency of this coefficient estimate hinges on the 
assumption of a common trend in sales prices shared by homes located within 1,000 feet of 
a mosque and all other homes in greater Baltimore.  Given the highly localized nature of real 
estate markets such an assumption may be inappropriate.  Therefore, I construct a second, 
more refined comparison group consisting of homes located within 1,000-2,000 feet of a 
mosque: 
log , , , , ∗
																						                                                                                               4.10  
 
where ,  is an indicator variable for homes located within 2,000 feet of a mosque.  
Again, the coefficient  measures the post 9/11 percentage in housing prices for homes 
                                                            
32 Neighborhoods are defined by census tract boundaries. 
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located within 1,000 feet of a mosque, but now relative to homes located between 1,000-
2,000 feet of a mosque.   
 Using only pre-period data and limiting my sample to homes sold within 2,000 feet 
of a mosque, I test my assumption of a common pre-period trend, conditional on building 
characteristics, in property value growth with the following specification: 
																																	log ,                                      4.11  
A statistically significant coefficient estimate,	 , attached to ,  would indicate 
differential pre-period trends in property value growth for homes located within 1,000 feet 
of a mosque and homes located between 1,000-2,000 feet of a mosque.  
4.6 Estimation Results  
4.6.1 The Common Trends Assumption 
 Limiting my sample to homes sold within 2,000 feet of a mosque, I estimate 
equation (4.11) with pre-period data and find no statistically significant differential trend in 
property value growth between homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque and homes 
located between 1,000-2,000 feet of a mosque (Table 4.2, column 1).  Running a similar 
specification, I find no statistically significant pre-period difference in building age or square 
footage for homes sold within 1,000 feet of a mosque and homes sold within 1,000-2,000 
feet of a mosque (Table 4.2, columns 2-3).  Taken together, these results suggest homes sold 
within 1,000-2,000 feet of a mosque can be confidently used as an appropriate comparison 
group to homes sold within 1,000 feet of a mosque. 
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4.6.2 Impact of Post September 11th, 2001 Increase in Anti-Islamic Sentiment     
Using all other greater Baltimore homes sales as my initial comparison group, I 
estimate equation (4.9) with year fixed effects and find an 10.1%33 post terrorist attack 
decline in property values for homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque, statistically 
significant at the 5% level (Table 4.3, column 1).  Next, I estimate equation (4.9) with 
neighborhood by year fixed effects and find a 13.2% decline, statistically significant at the 
1% level (Table 4.3, column 2).  This indicates that post terrorist attacks, homes sold within 
1,000 feet of a mosque declined in value by 13.2% relative to other residential properties 
located within the same neighborhood and sold during the same year.   
Moving to my second comparison group, homes located within 1,000-2,000 feet of a 
mosque, I estimate equation (4.10) with year fixed effects and find a 17.7% post terrorist 
attack decline in property values for homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque, 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 4.3, column 3).  Re-estimating equation (4.10) 
with neighborhood by year fixed effects; I find a 17.1% decline, statistically significant at the 
1% level (Table 4.3, column 4).  This indicates that post terrorist attacks, homes sold within 
1,000 feet of a mosque declined in value by 17.1% relative to homes located within 1,000-
2,000 feet of a mosque within the same neighborhood and sold during the same year. 
4.6.2a Varying Impact with Time since Terrorist Attacks  
To examine how the impact of the post September 11th, 2001 increase in anti-Islamic 
sentiment varied with time since the attacks, I add two additional interaction terms to 
                                                            
33 Because  , ∗  is a binary measure, its correlation coefficient measures	∆log /∆	 , ∗
.  This can be re‐expressed as follows:   log , , 	/	 1 0 log ,
, .  Exponentiating, subtracting one from each side, and multiplying by 100 yields:  exp
1 ∗ 100 , , ∗ 100/ , , or the percentage change in sales price due to post 
September 11th, 2001 proximity to a mosque.   
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equation (4.10), , ∗ ∗ 	 	  and , ∗ ∗  
	 	  and graph the resulting coefficient estimates in Figure 4.634.  
As illustrated, three months after the attacks homes located within 1,000 feet of a 
mosque had decreased in value by 4% relative to homes in the same neighborhood located 
within 1,000-2,000 feet of a mosque.  Nine months after, homes within 1,000 feet of a 
mosque were devalued by 10.1%.  Over the next two years, homes located with 1,000 feet of 
a mosque continued to decline in value relative to homes in the same neighborhood located 
within 1,000-2,000 feet of a mosque.  By fall 2004, the impact of a post September 11th, 2001 
increase in anti-Islamic reached its peak with homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque 
devalued by 22.9% relative to homes in the same neighborhood located within 1,000-2,000 
feet of a mosque.  Taken together, this three year sustained decline in home values suggests 
less of an immediate abreaction to the events of September 11th, 2001, and more of a slow 
fomenting prejudice towards Arab Americans and Islam, coinciding with the lead-up to and 
first year of the Iraq war, a period defined, at least among certain cohorts, by increasing 
American nationalism and anti-Arab sentiment.   
From fall 2004 through spring 2007, the property value impact of anti-Islamic 
sentiment attenuated and by September 2007, six years after the attacks, homes located 
within 1,000 feet of a mosque were devalued by less than 1% relative to homes in the same 
neighborhood located between 1,000-2,000 feet of a mosque.  This attenuation can be 
attributed to two potential factors: a nationwide decrease in anti-Islamic sentiment brought 
                                                            
34 In support of the dynamic analysis, a less restrictive analysis sample is used to increase the number of 
post period sales attached to homes within 1,000 feet of a mosque.  This sample includes observations 
missing one or more of the following: a measure of building quality, number of stories, age, and square 
footage.  To control for missing data, the dynamic specification includes a series of indicator variables for 
each of the aforementioned building characteristics.    
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on by the increasing length of time since the attacks and a rising dissatisfaction with the Iraq 
war dampening nationalistic anti-Arab sentiment, and a new sorting equilibrium in 
neighborhoods surrounding mosques, populated by fewer household types prejudiced 
towards Islam. 
4.6.2b Varying Impact at Different Points along the Property Value Distribution 
To investigate whether a post September 11th, 2001 increase in anti-Islamic sentiment 
has had an equal impact on heterogeneous properties, I run a simultaneous quantile 
regression35 estimating the impact of proximity to a mosque for homes at different points 
along Baltimore’s property value distribution and graph the resulting coefficient estimates in 
Figure 4.7.   
Interestingly, as property values increase, the magnitude of the estimated impact of 
anti-Islamic sentiment declines.  At the 20th percentile of the property value distribution, 
proximity to a mosque post terrorist attacks is estimated to reduce property values by over 
30%.  At the 40th percentile of the property value distribution, proximity to a mosque post 
terrorist attacks only reduces property values by an estimated 8.6%.  And for homes at the 
60th and 80th percentiles of the property value distribution, the estimated effect of proximity 
to a mosque post terrorist attacks is statistically insignificant.  This declining impact 
potentially suggests a more moderated reaction among wealthier households, which is 
investigated below. 
 
 
                                                            
35 Because of computational constraints, this regression includes neighborhood and year fixed effects 
instead of neighborhood‐by‐year fixed effects. 
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4.6.3 Differential Impact across Homes Stratified by Neighborhood Income 
 As discussed in the theoretical framework (Section 4.3), the impact of a post 
September 11th, 2001 increase in anti-Islamic sentiment varies across income-taste classes, 
with certain household types willing to pay more to avoid proximity to a mosque, and others 
willing to pay less.  In order to better understand this heterogeneous effect, I investigate the 
differential impact of proximity to a mosque, post terrorist attacks, across pre-period 
neighborhood-level median household income by re-estimating equation (4.10) with two 
additional interaction terms: , ∗ ∗ 	  and , ∗
∗ 	 .  The coefficient estimates attached to the interaction 
terms are statistically significant at the 1% level, and results are graphed in Figure 4.8.   
For homes located in neighborhoods characterized by a median household income 
of less than $30,000, post September 11th, 2001 proximity to a mosque resulted in an 
approximately 20% property value decline.  As illustrated in Figure 4.8, starting at $30,000, 
the impact of anti-Islamic sentiment begins to decrease as median household income climbs.  
For homes located in neighborhoods with a median household income of $50,000, post 
September 11th, 2001 proximity to a mosque resulted in only a 12% property value decline.  
At the top of the income distribution for neighborhoods surrounding mosques, proximity to 
a mosque post terrorist attacks had a negligible property value impact.  
This declining impact coheres with results from the simultaneous quantile regression 
and suggests that households in wealthier neighborhoods were less likely to perceive 
proximity to a mosque as a neighborhood disamenity post September 11th, 2001.  To the 
extent income is correlated with education, the muted property value impact among higher 
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income households may be a function of a broader cultural understanding and tolerance 
attained through higher education36.    
4.7 Sensitivity Tests 
4.7.1 Two Alternative Measures of Proximity to a Mosque 
 As a robustness check, I re-estimate equation (4.10) using two alternative measures 
of proximity, homes located within 500 feet of a mosque and homes located within 750 feet 
of a mosque.  Using 500 feet as my measure of proximity, I find that post September 11th, 
2001 homes sold within 500 of a mosque decline in value by 16.4% relative to homes sold 
between 500 and 2,000 feet of a mosque, a result statistically significant at the 5% level 
(Table 4.4, column 1).  Using 750 feet as my measure of proximity, I find that homes sold 
within 750 feet of a mosque decline in value by 23.1% relative to homes sold between 750 
and 2000 feet of a mosque, a result statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 4.4, column 
2).  I attribute the larger magnitude of this second estimate to a cleaner division of affected 
and non-affected properties.  When examining homes located within 500 feet of a mosque 
relative to homes located within 500 to 2,000 feet of a mosque, my control group contains a 
                                                            
36To more directly test this hypothesis, I examine the differential impact of proximity to a mosque, post‐
terrorist attacks, across neighborhood‐level educational attainment by re‐estimating equation (4.10) with 
two  additional  interaction  terms:    D , ∗ Post ∗ Neighborhood	Education  and  D , ∗ Post ∗  
Neighborhood	Education .   The  coefficient  estimates  attached  to  the  added  interaction  terms  are 
statistically significant at the 5% level and indicate that for homes located in neighborhoods with less than 
40 percent of the over 25 population college educated, post September 11th, 2001 proximity to a mosque 
resulted  in  an  approximately  21%  property  value  decline.    Alternatively,  for  homes  located  in 
neighborhoods with 50 percent of the over 25 population college educated, post September 11th, 2001 
proximity  to  a  mosque  resulted  in  only  a  13%  property  value  decline.    For  homes  located  in 
neighborhoods with more than 60 percent of the over 25 population college educated, post September 
11th, 2001 proximity to a mosque had a negligible property value  impact.   Because neighborhood‐level 
educational  attainment  is  positively  correlated  with  income,  these  results  cannot  be  completely 
deconvoluted from the effect of wealth.    
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cohort of homes still significantly impacted by proximity to a mosque, which mutes any 
differential estimated impact.     
4.7.2 Proximity to a Jewish Temple  
 Given that among properties situated near places of worship, only those in close 
proximity to a mosque are likely to be detrimentally impacted by an increase in anti-Islamic 
sentiment, I run a falsification test by re-estimating equation (4.10) with a placebo treatment 
group, homes located within 1,000 feet of a Jewish temple.  If I find that areas surrounding 
Jewish temples were similarly negatively affected, it would call into question my proposed 
mechanism of impact.  Alternatively, if I find no negative effect, it would suggest there is 
something specific to areas surrounding mosques that led to their negative property value 
growth post 9/11.  Running the falsification test, I find that post attack proximity to a 
Jewish temple has no statistically significant effect on property values (Table 4.5).   
4.7.3 False Event Date 
Next, to test the validity of my results, I run a falsification test using an erroneous 
attack date set two years prior to September 11, 2001.  Confining my sample to pre-period 
data, I re-estimate equation (4.10) with this false event date, and find no statistically 
significant result (Table 4.6).  This formal test of the parallel trends assumption, which 
underlies my difference-in-difference specification, indicates no evidence of a spurious 
effect.  Unfortunately, I am unable to run a similar test with an erroneous attack date set one 
year prior to September 11, 2001 because of a paucity of September 2000–September 2001 
sales data for homes located within 1,000 feet of a mosque.      
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4.8 Conclusion 
In this paper I examine the impact of the post September 11th, 2001 increase in anti-
Islamic sentiment on property values, specifically investigating whether after the terrorist 
attacks homes within close proximity to a mosque dropped in value.  Using a difference-in-
difference methodology, I find that post terrorist attacks, homes located within 1,000 feet of 
a mosque decreased in value by over 17% relative to homes located between 1,000-2,000 feet 
of a mosque.  This decline in value is statistically significant at the one percent level and 
robust to a number of specifications.   
Recent events involving a proposed mosque near the site of the former World Trade 
Center have reignited a national discussion about anti-Islamic sentiment and residential 
proximity to local mosques.  Across the country, news reports have abounded with residents 
voicing dissatisfaction about their relative proximity to nearby mosques.  Although too soon 
to formally test, it’s likely this new wave of anti-Islamic sentiment has again detrimentally 
impacted property values for homes in close proximity to a mosque. 
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Figure 2.4: Map of 2004-2005 Title 1 and “Failing” Elementary Schools in 
Mecklenburg County. 
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Figure 2.5: The Varying Impact of a NCLB “Failing” School Designation                                    
in the Months Post Initial Announcement. 
 
Figure 2.6: Coefficient Estimates from Simultaneous Quantile Regression. 
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Figure 2.7: Pre and Post-“Failing” Announcement Bids: No Re-Sorting. 
 
Figure 2.8: Pre and Post-“Failing” Announcement Bids: Re-Sorting. 
 
Bid
Income-Taste Class A
Income-Taste Class B
Market
Impact
Impact on 
Pre-Announcement 
Occupants
Pre-"Failing"
Announcement
Post-"Failing"
Announcement
Bid
Pre-"Failing"
Announcement
Income-Taste Class A
Income-Taste Class B
Market
Impact
Impact on 
Pre-Anouncement 
Occupants
Post-"Failing"
Announcement
 
72 
 
Figure 2.9: A Two Stage Analysis of the Differential Impact of a NCLB “Failing” 
School Designation across Income-Taste Classes. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Price Trends Before and After Homicide. 
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Figure 3.2: Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint in the Absence of a Local 
Homicide. 
 
Figure 3.3: Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint in the Event of a Local 
Homicide. 
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Figure 3.4: Pre and Post-Homicide Bids: No Re-Sorting.  
 
Figure 3.5: Pre and Post-Homicide Bids: Re-Sorting.  
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Figure 3.8: Varying Impact at Different Points along the Property Value Distribution. 
 
Figure 3.9: The Impact of a Homicide with Distance from the Crime. 
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Figure 3.10: Impact of a Homicide with Time since the Crime. 
  
Figure 4.1: Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint Prior to the Terrorist Attacks 
on September 11th, 2001. 
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Figure 4.2: Indifference Curve and Budget Constraint after the September 11th, 2001 
Terrorist Attacks. 
 
Figure 4.3: Pre and Post-Attack Bids: No Re-Sorting. 
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Figure 4.4: Pre and Post-Attack Bids: Re-Sorting. 
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Figure 4.6: The Impact of A Post September 11th, 2001 Increase in Anti-Islamic 
Sentiment in the Years Following the Terrorist Attacks. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Coefficient Estimates from Simultaneous Quantile Regression. 
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Figure 4.8: Varying Impact of Proximity to a Mosque with Neighborhood Income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‐60%
‐50%
‐40%
‐30%
‐20%
‐10%
0%
10%
20%
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 C
h
an
ge
Median Household Income
($10,000)
Coefficient Estimate
 
84 
 
Table 2.1: 2003-2004 adequate yearly progress reports for four Title 1 schools. 
Hidden Valley Elementary - Did Not Meet AYP, "Failing" 
  All Students 
American
Indian Asian Black Hispanic 
Multi- 
Racial White 
Economically
Disadvantaged 
Limited 
English 
Proficient 
Students 
With 
Disabilities 
Reading Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 301 <5 <5 209 84 <5 <5 270 70 20 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 
Percent Proficient 75.2% * * 83.1% 51.7% * * 73.3% 46.3% * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met No Data Insuf Data Met Met w/ SH Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Not Met Insuf Data 
Mathematics Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 302 <5 <5 209 85 <5 <5 271 71 20 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 
Percent Proficient 89.2% * * 91.3% 83.3% * * 87.7% 82.1% * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met No Data Insuf Data Met Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Met Insuf Data 
Nations Ford Elementary - Met AYP, "Non-Failing" 
  All Students 
American
Indian Asian Black Hispanic 
Multi- 
Racial White 
Economically
Disadvantaged 
Limited 
English 
Proficient 
Students 
With 
Disabilities 
Reading Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 188 <5 <5 126 37 <5 16 161 28 24 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 
Percent Proficient 73.4% * * 70.9% * * * 69.0% * * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data 
Mathematics Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 189 <5 <5 126 38 <5 16 162 29 24 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 
Percent Proficient 87.7% * * 85.5% * * * 86.0% * * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data 
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Table 2.1: 2003-2004 adequate yearly progress reports for four Title 1 schools (continued). 
Oakdale Elementary - Met AYP, "Non-Failing" 
  All Students 
American
Indian Asian Black Hispanic 
Multi- 
Racial White 
Economically
Disadvantaged 
Limited 
English 
Proficient 
Students 
With 
Disabilities 
Reading Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 215 6 6 145 10 <5 46 155 8 27 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 
Percent Proficient 72.8% * * 69.8% * * 84.4% 68.4% * * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Met w/ CI Insuf Data Insuf Data 
Mathematics Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 215 6 6 145 10 <5 46 155 8 27 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 
Percent Proficient 88.0% * * 85.3% * * >95% 86.5% * * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Met Insuf Data Insuf Data 
Westerly Hills - Met AYP, "Non-Failing" 
  All Students 
American
Indian Asian Black Hispanic 
Multi- 
Racial White 
Economically
Disadvantaged 
Limited 
English 
Proficient 
Students 
With 
Disabilities 
Reading Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 182 5 13 138 12 <5 11 159 22 27 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 
Percent Proficient 66.9% * * 70.6% * * * 63.2% * * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met w/ CI Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Met w/ CI Insuf Data Insuf Data 
    
Mathematics Grades 3 through 8                     
Number of Students Tested 215 6 6 145 10 <5 46 155 8 27 
    
Target Goal Percent Proficient 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 74.6% 
Percent Proficient 76.4% * * 79.8% * * * 73.5% * * 
Met AYP Proficiency Goal? Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Insuf Data Insuf Data Met Met w/ CI Insuf Data Insuf Data 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of Homes Sold in Mecklenburg County, June 2002-May 
2006. 
  Entire Sample   
Parcels in “Failing” 
School  
Catchment Zones 
  
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)   
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Sale Price
($100,000) 
2.060 
(1.444) 
1.101 
(0.866) 
Square Footage
(1,000 Square Feet) 
2.113 
(0.916) 
1.330 
(0.487) 
Quality Rating (1-6) 3.273 
(1.212) 
2.709 
(0.963) 
Age 12.021 
(11.981) 
24.942 
(10.603) 
Bedrooms 3.261 
(0.774) 
2.645 
(0.873) 
Bathrooms 2.047 
(0.640) 
1.444 
(0.573) 
    
  Percentage Percentage 
Air-Conditioned 91.9% 62.2% 
Story Height   
1 35.5% 78.5% 
1.5 6.3% 4.0% 
2 54.5% 14.2% 
3 or more 3.8% 3.3% 
Quality Tier   
Below Average 0.7% 2.7% 
Average 76.5% 90.0% 
Good 16.6%  5.3%  
Very Good 4.5%  2.0%  
Excellent 1.1% 0.1% 
Custom 0.6% 0.0% 
Sample Size 84,405   3,573 
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Table 2.3: Impact of a “Failing” School Designation. 
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Percentage Proficient: 4th Grade Math and Reading 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
"Failing" Designation -0.071*** -0.048** -0.058*** -0.076***   
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)   
"Failing" Designation x Time Since Initial Announcement -0.180*** 
  (0.058) 
"Failing" Designation x Time Since Initial 
Announcement^2 0.194*** 
  (0.063) 
"Failing" Designation x Time Since Initial 
Announcement^3 -0.053*** 
  (0.017) 
    
Housing Characteristics x x x x x 
Neighborhood and Year Fixed Effects x x 
Neighborhood-by-Year Fixed Effects x x x   
Sample Restricted to Title 1 Neighborhoods x   
Sample Restricted to Dual Attendance Zone 
Neighborhoods    
x   
Standard Errors Clustered by . . School School School School School 
    
Sample Size 83,569 83,569 19,201 28,375 83,569 
R2 0.732 0.721 0.611 0.700 0.715 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.4: Impact of a “Failing” School Designation: Houses Stratified by Number 
of Bedrooms. 
  Log of Sales Price 
  0-2 Bedrooms 3+ Bedrooms 
  (1) (2) 
"Failing" Designation -0.051 -0.078*** 
  (0.041) (0.029) 
Percentage Proficient: 4th Grade Math and Reading 0.004** 0.001*** 
  (0.002) (0.000) 
    
Housing Characteristics x x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x x 
Standard Errors Clustered by . . School School 
    
Sample Size 6,061 77,508 
R2 0.733 0.715 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2.5: Falsification Test. 
  
Baseline 
Estimates   
"Failing" 
Announcement
Set Two Years 
Prior 
        
"Failing" Designation -0.071***   0.016 
  (0.024)   (0.013) 
Percentage Proficient: 4th Grade Math and 
Reading 0.002***   0.002*** 
  (0.000)   (0.001) 
      
Housing Characteristics x   x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x   x 
Standard Errors Clustered by . . School   School 
      
Sample Size 83,569   28,906 
R2 0.732   0.702 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Homes Sold in Mecklenburg County, 2000-2004. 
  Entire Sample   Within 1000 Ft 
  
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)   
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Sale Price
($100,000) 
2.084 
(1.370) 
1.141 
(0.911) 
Square Footage
(1,000 Square Feet) 
2.074 
(0.886) 
1.372 
(0.659) 
Quality Rating (1-6) 3.257 
(1.214) 
2.458 
(0.861) 
Age 11.569 
(11.941) 
22.349 
(11.579) 
Bedrooms 3.314 
(0.654) 
2.826 
(0.696) 
Bathrooms 2.025 
(0.617) 
1.467 
(0.624) 
    
  Percentage Percentage 
Air-Conditioned 92.6% 60.1% 
Sold in Year Built 24.5% 7.9% 
Story Height   
1 37.8% 74.8% 
1.5 6.5% 3.5% 
2 51.2% 17.7% 
3 or more 4.5% 4.0% 
Quality Tier   
Below Average 0.7% 4.5% 
Average 75.1% 89.8% 
Good 18.2% 3.3% 
Very Good 4.6% 2.4% 
Excellent 1.1% 0.0% 
Custom 0.4% 0.0% 
Sample Size 87,617   840 
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Table 3.2: Pre-Homicide Differences in Characteristics of Homes Sold Close to a 
Homicide. 
Pre-Homicide  
Differences in Sales: 
Log of  
Sales Price Age 
Square 
Footage Bedrooms Bathrooms 
Within 500 Ft of Homicide 0.066 -0.274 -69.914 -0.026 -0.034 
  (0.050) (0.930) (45.884) (0.079) (0.048) 
Constant 11.418*** 22.382*** 1,403.210*** 2.813*** 1.486*** 
  (0.013) (0.244) (12.047) (0.021) (0.013) 
    
Neighborhood-Year Fixed 
Effects x x x x x 
    
Standard Errors Clustered by . . Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood 
    
Sample Size 438 438 438 438 438 
R2 0.737 0.824 0.855 0.633 0.835 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.3: Impact of a Homicide on Property Value. 
  
Log of  
Sales Price 
(Pre-
Homicide)   
Log of Sales Price, Pre- and 
Post-Homicide 
  (1)   (2) (3) 
Within 500 Ft of Homicide -0.009   0.031 0.077 
  (0.041)   (0.046) (0.048) 
Within 500 Ft x Post-Homicide   -0.108** -0.144** 
    (0.053) (0.057) 
Within 500 Ft x  Post x Days Since Homicide     
      
Within 1000 Ft of Homicide   -0.054** 
    (0.025) 
Within 1000 Ft x Post-Homicide   0.037 
    (0.044) 
      
Housing Characteristics   x x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x   x x 
Standard Errors Clustered by . . Neighborhood   Neighborhood Neighborhood 
      
Sample Size 86,564   86,935 86,935 
R2 0.734   0.782 0.782 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4– Impact of a Homicide on Property Value across High and Low Crime Areas 
  
Level of  
Pre-Period Total Crime 
Level of  
Pre-Period Property Crime 
Level of  
Pre-Period Violent Crime 
  Low High Low High Low High 
              
Within 500 Ft of Homicide 0.087 0.069 0.107* 0.060 0.068 0.073 
  (0.054) (0.067) (0.064) (0.062) (0.070) (0.059) 
Within 500 Ft x Post-Homicide -0.294*** -0.099 -0.316*** -0.098 -0.182* -0.167* 
  (0.089) (0.110) (0.102) (0.102) (0.099) (0.089) 
Within 1000 Ft of Homicide -0.000 -0.063 0.009 -0.064 0.028 -0.077* 
  (0.025) (0.044) (0.027) (0.041) (0.025) (0.041) 
Within 1000 Ft x Post-Homicide 0.015 0.042 0.018 0.039 -0.045 0.075 
  (0.043) (0.065) (0.050) (0.062) (0.057) (0.054) 
    
Housing Characteristics x x x x x x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Standard Errors Clustered by . . Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood 
    
Sample Size 35,483 35,061 34,905 35,639 34,237 36,307 
R2 0.795 0.803 0.795 0.803 0.800 0.796 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Falsification Tests. 
  
Baseline 
Estimates   
One-Year 
Prior  
Homicide 
Dates 
Two-Year 
Prior  
Homicide 
Dates 
          
Within 500 Ft of Homicide 0.077   0.071 0.021 
  (0.048)   (0.049) (0.031) 
Within 500 Ft x Post-Homicide -0.144**   -0.015 0.040 
  (0.057)   (0.069) (0.048) 
Within 1000 Ft of Homicide -0.054**   -0.046 -0.035* 
  (0.025)   (0.036) (0.020) 
Within 1000 Ft x Post-
Homicide 
0.037 
  
-0.001 0.006 
  (0.044)   (0.039) (0.033) 
      
Housing Characteristics x   x x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed 
Effects x   x x 
Standard Errors Clustered by . . Neighborhood   Neighborhood Neighborhood 
      
Sample Size 86,564   83,995 81,994 
R2 0.734   0.812 0.852 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of Homes Sold in Baltimore, 1998-2007. 
  Entire Sample   Within 2,000 Ft 
  
Mean 
(Standard Deviation)   
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Sale Price
($100,000) 
2.265 
(1.480) 
2.079 
(1.196) 
Square Footage
(1,000 Square Feet) 
1.508 
(0.624) 
1.636 
(0.789) 
Age 
48.876 
(23.618) 
51.238 
(22.122) 
    
  Percentage Percentage 
Story Height   
1 16.0% 23.0% 
1.5 11.4% 8.0% 
2 64.5% 49.7% 
2.5 or More 8.1% 19.4% 
Quality Tier   
1 0.8% 0.7% 
2 52.5% 50.1% 
3 37.1% 43.5% 
4 8.2% 5.0% 
5 1.2% 0.5% 
6 0.2% 0.2% 
Sample Size 146,050   1,054 
 
Table 4.2: Pre-Terrorist Attack Differences in Characteristics of Homes Sold Close to 
a Mosque 
Pre-Terrorist Attack
Differences: 
Log of  
Sales Price Age 
Square 
Footage 
Within 1,000 Ft of Mosque 0.052 -3.506 -147.178 
  (0.069) (3.523) (126.113) 
Constant 11.758*** 53.242*** 1,654.013*** 
  (0.018) (0.910) (32.579) 
    
Neighborhood-Year Fixed 
Effects x x x 
    
Sample Size 360 360 360 
R2 0.656 0.401 0.396 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard Errors Clustered by Neighborhood-Year 
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Table 4.3: Impact of Post September 11th, 2001 Increase in Anti-Islamic Sentiment. 
  Log of Sales Price, Pre- and Post-Terrorist Attacks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Within 1,000 Ft of Mosque -0.080*** 0.086** 0.146*** 0.121** 0.107 
  (0.024) (0.035) (0.055) (0.052) (0.066) 
Within 1,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist Attacks -0.107** -0.141*** -0.195*** -0.188***   
  (0.050) (0.054) (0.072) (0.070)   
Within 1,000 Ft x Post x Time Since Terrorist Attacks -0.173*** 
  (0.062) 
Within 1,000 Ft x Post x Time Since Terrorist 
Attacks^2 0.029*** 
  (0.011) 
Within 2,000 Ft of Mosque -0.227*** -0.052 -0.066 
  (0.060) (0.054) (0.052) 
Within 2,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist Attacks 0.089 0.069 0.061 
  (0.068) (0.059) (0.059) 
    
Housing Characteristics x x x x x 
Sale Year Fixed Effects x x   
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x x x 
    
Sample Size 146,050 146,050 146,050 146,050 151,169 
R2 0.665 0.751 0.665 0.751 0.738 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard Errors Clustered by Neighborhood-Year 
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Table 4.4: Impact at Varying Proximities to a Mosque. 
  Log of Sales Price, Pre- and Post-Terrorist Attacks 
      
Within 500 Ft of a Mosque 0.131**   
  (0.063)   
Within 500 Ft x Post-Terrorist Attacks -0.179**   
  (0.085)   
Within 750 Ft of a Mosque  0.147** 
   (0.067) 
Within 750 Ft x Post-Terrorist Attacks  -0.263*** 
   (0.091) 
Within 2,000 Ft of Mosque -0.035 -0.046 
  (0.049) (0.052) 
Within 2,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist Attacks 0.043 0.064 
  (0.054) (0.057) 
Housing Characteristics x x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x x 
    
Sample Size 146,050 146,050 
R2 0.751 0.751 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard Errors Clustered by Neighborhood-Year 
 
Table 4.5: Distance from a Jewish Temple. 
  
 
Distance from a 
Mosque   
 
Distance from a 
Temple 
        
Within 1,000 Ft 0.121**   0.037 
  (0.052)   (0.025) 
Within 1,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist 
Attacks -0.188***   0.003 
  (0.070)   (0.032) 
Within 2,000 Ft -0.052   -0.048*** 
  (0.054)   (0.017) 
Within 2,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist 
Attacks 0.069   0.003 
  (0.059)   (0.019) 
      
Housing Characteristics x   x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x   x 
      
Sample Size 146,050   146,050 
R2 0.751   0.751 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard Errors Clustered by Neighborhood-Year 
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Table 4.6: Falsification Test. 
  
Baseline 
Estimates   
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Dated Two-
Years Prior   
        
Within 1,000 Ft of Mosque 0.121**   0.132 
  (0.052)   (0.082) 
Within 1,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist 
Attacks -0.188***   -0.016 
  (0.070)   (0.103) 
Within 2,000 Ft of Mosque -0.052   -0.031 
  (0.054)   (0.095) 
Within 2,000 Ft x Post-Terrorist 
Attacks 0.069   -0.013 
  (0.059)   (0.103) 
      
Housing Characteristics x   x 
Neighborhood-Year Fixed Effects x   x 
      
Sample Size 146,050   54,615 
R2 0.751   0.716 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard Errors Clustered by Neighborhood-Year 
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